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"Too often it's the same children, year after year, who bear the burden of re-
jection. They're made to feel like strangers."




Jamie was placed in foster care at age six, when the severe head injuries re-
sulting from his father's abuse were discovered by an emergency room doctor.
2
After a few weeks, Jamie's foster parents told the Child Protective Services
(C.P.S.) social worker that they could no longer care for the child because he
had difficulty understanding more complicated instructions and speaking, and
his movements were sometimes spastic.
Jamie's social worker secured him another foster care placement and he
was enrolled in first grade at the local school. His teacher soon reported that
he had difficulties speaking, appeared to be cognitively delayed, and had fre-
quent outbursts in class. She referred him for a special education assessment.
The C.P.S. worker could not locate Jamie's mother to consent to such an as-
sessment, nor could she obtain his father's consent. No surrogate parent was
appointed for Jamie's education, and his foster parents told the worker that
school affairs were not part of their role and they didn't understand them. The
t Skadden Fellow, Child Care Law Center; Judicial Clerk to the Hon. Edward R. Korman, U.S.
District Court, E.D.N.Y. 1998-99; J.D. 1998, Harvard Law School. In February, 2001, Cynthia will
join the Cathryn A. McDonald Education Advocacy Project at the Legal Aid Society, Juvenile Rights
Division in the Bronx, New York, where she will work on educational advocacy for children in the child
welfare system.
1. ViVIAN GussIN PALEY, YOU CAN'T SAY YOU CAN'T PLAY 22 (1992).
2. These narratives are based in part on my clinical experiences working with children in the child
welfare system at Lawyers for Children in New York, Legal Services for Children in San Francisco, and
as a Court Appointed Special Advocate in Boston. I also learned a great deal by visiting and volunteer-
ing in a number of schools with inclusionary programs serving some foster youth in Massachusetts and
California. Finally, I have also been informed by conversations and meetings with Foster Youth Serv-
ices-a unique organization whose mandate is to bridge the very gaps I discuss here and focus on the
educational needs of foster youth.
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lack of consent from a parent or legal surrogate prohibited any assessment.
Jamie remained in the regular first grade classroom for two years.
Finally, Jamie's new social worker requested that he be appointed an edu-
cational surrogate parent by the court. The surrogate requested an assessment.
The assessment team concluded that Jamie is developmentally delayed, possi-
bly due to his head injuries or pre-natal exposure to drugs. The team devel-
oped an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for Jamie, which the surrogate
parent signed. After several months of intensive special education services,
Jamie was demonstrating marked improvement in both cognitive skills and
speech.
A year later, Jamie was removed from his foster parents to a pre-adoptive
placement with another family. His school records, including IEP, were lost in
the transfer from one school district to another. Jamie cannot perform the same
assignments as his third grade classmates can, and he cannot read. He stopped
talking in class after one child made fun of his speech. Jamie's teacher hasn't
noticed because her attention is taken up by the other louder students, and she
is the only adult in the classroom. The principal has never told her that any of
her students are in foster care. Jamie is increasingly withdrawn at home and
his new foster parents are unsure if they still want to adopt him.
Megan
Megan is fourteen years old and has been in the child welfare system since
birth. She has moved around frequently, living alternatively with four different
foster families, her mother for very brief stints, and her paternal grandmother.
Megan's mother abuses drugs and is unable to care for her, but drops in on her
a few times a year. Megan was recently moved to a group home which is
about an hour away from the junior high school she has been attending.
As a result of this moving around, Megan has been enrolled at seven differ-
ent schools since first grade. She has had problems in school since she was in
fourth grade, problems that included primarily acting out in class and fighting
with other students and teachers. These behavioral problems often coincided
with changes in placement or court dates. She has also consistently performed
at the bottom of her class, not out of a demonstrated difficulty with the mate-
rial, but rather for failing to turn in homework and, as she got older, cutting
school. Megan's teachers over the years seem to be unanimous in their char-
acterization of her as a problem child. Megan has never received tutoring,
counseling, or any support services at school until last month when she was
placed in a special education classroom.
Her eighth grade teacher referred her for a special education evaluation at
the beginning of this year. As Megan's mother's educational rights have not
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been limited,3 the school did not appoint Megan a surrogate parent. Instead,
when they could not locate her mother to secure consent for the assessment, the
school district instituted a due process hearing to override the need for parental
consent. Megan's new Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) has tried to
advocate for her because she thinks Megan needs some extra support in the
general education program, such as mentoring and tutoring after school, rather
than placement in a special education program. But the CASA has repeatedly
been told by school officials that they are not required to include her. The as-
sessment team diagnosed Megan as having serious emotional disturbance
(SED) and placed her in a separate special education classroom with children
having SED and mild mental retardation. The youths in the class are learning
material ranging from a fourth to a seventh grade level.
Megan hates her new class and has hardly attended school since she was
placed there. One of the teachers at Megan's school told her CASA that they
were considering placing Megan in a residential school because they're not
sure what else to do with her. The CASA is worried that Megan will drop out
of school altogether or run away.
Stories like Jamie's and Megan's are unfortunately all too common among
children in out-of-home placement.4 About half a million children are in out-
of-home care in this country,5 and many of them are erroneously placed in
special education programs or have special education needs which go unrecog-
6nized and untreated. There is a very high overlap between children in the
child welfare system and children who are educationally at-risk.7 Many of the
3. This narrative is based upon a case in California, thus incorporating California law requiring
that a parent's educational rights be terminated or limited separately from his or her other parental rights
such as custody, so parents whose children are in the dependency system may still have educational
rights as far as they are concerned. For further discussion of this requirement and the surrogate parent
issue, see infra at Part I.C.
4. The term "out of home placement" is used here to include children in state custody as depend-
ents whether placed in family foster care, kinship foster care or residential care such as group homes. I
will often use "foster care system" to refer to the child welfare out-of-home placement system. This
includes children placed in the child welfare system both voluntarily by their parents and by court order
based on a finding of abuse or neglect. This Article does not address the intersection of children found
"delinquent" and at educational risk, although this also is a very serious problem meriting research, con-
cern and advocacy, for a discussion of delinquency and special education. See LOREN WARBOYS ET
AL., CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT SPECIAL EDUCATION MANUAL 42 (1994).
5. An estimated 530,496 children lived in out-of-home care at the end of 1996. Michael R. Petit &
Patrick A. Curtis, Child Abuse and Neglect: A Look at the States, in 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK at 72
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK].
6. See the detailed discussion of this overlap infra at Part I.C.
7. The definition of "at risk" is difficult--do we mean outcome or factors that heighten or lower
risk status?-There is also little consensus on the correct definition among educators and social scien-
tists even once the scope has been determined. See Gladys M. Cormier, INCREASING KNOWLEDGE AND
ASSESSMENT OF FOSTER CARE CHILDREN THROUGH IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
EDUCATORS (Ph.D. dissertation, Nova University) (Ed 375 950, 1994) at 24-25. Here I will frame at-
risk in terms of inclusionary education; i.e. at risk for referral to more segregated and restrictive educa-
tional surroundings, so part of this inquiry concerns what teachers consider to be "at-risk" in making
their referrals. See also the related definition of "educational disability" used by Loren Warboys et al.
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children in each system are our most vulnerable children, frequently disadvan-
taged by disability, poverty, and abuse and neglect.
These children often receive inadequate care in the two most important
places in their lives-home and school. Under-funded and overburdened child
protection and education systems fail in their mission of adequately overseeing
children's healthy development in school and at home. Moreover, the systemic
structures are at odds with each other both theoretically and practically, and do
not take into account the full spectrum of needs of children in out-of-home
care. There are few bridges between the systems: social workers may see their
job as placing a child and trying to stabilize her home life, whereas teachers
may envision their job as ending at the school house door. Both overlook the
complex interrelationship between a child's home and school needs and care.
Despite the clear disjunct between these systems and the startlingly high over-
lap of children in out-of-home care and children placed in restrictive education
settings, little attention has been paid to this problem either by child welfare or
special education personnel.8
The child protection system relies on foster care as a temporary home for
children awaiting reunification or adoption. Yet most children stay in foster
care for over a year9 and many are never reunified with their biological fami-
lies or adopted; instead they serve out their childhoods in foster care "limbo."
Foster families are not granted rights in their relationships, unlike biological
and adoptive families.10 Moreover, emotional attachments between foster par-
ents and children are often discouraged or even forbidden by the child welfare
system. 
1
Parental rights lie at the very heart of the special education system--en-
forcement of a child's right to identification and services is premised on pa-
rental advocacy, 12 and assessment and service provision initially require pa-
"to describe any disability which results in eligibility for special education and related services."
WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 83 n. 149.
8. "The issue of the educational needs of children in foster care is a critical need that's really been
ignored," according to Mary Lee Ellen, director of child-welfare and mental health at the Children's
Defense Fund, (quoted in Deborah L. Cohen, Foster-Care Reforms Often Ignore Problems Children
Face in School, 10 EDUCATION WEEK, June 5, 1991 available at
http://www.edweek.org/ew/1991/103/002/hl0 (last visited Nov. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Cohen, June 5]).
The lack of consideration of this topic is clear in the lack of national statistics on this subject, and the
apparent scant information or consideration in protocols of at least some education and child protection
departments.
9. Petit & Curtis, supra note 5, at 108-9.
10. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform (OFFER), 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
11. In re Jewish Child Care Association, 5 N.Y.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1959).
12. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(3) (West 2000), Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (as
amended by the IDEA Amendments of 1997) (hereinafter all citations to IDEA will incorporate the
1997 Amendments).
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rental consent. 13 This statutory structure fails to adequately consider the situa-
tion of children without parents willing or legally sanctioned to advocate in
their interest. And youth themselves are not included in the process at all. As
a result, children in out-of-home care are at risk both for under and over-
identification with regard to special education. Many lack essential services,
while others are placed in overly restrictive educational environments.14
In this Article, I will examine the intersection between children in out-of-
home care and children at-risk educationally in an attempt to arrive at some
suggestions for change in theory and practice which can better empower these
children and ensure them equality in both realms. In Part I, I consider the
statutory systems of foster care and special education, looking at the charac-
teristics of the large number of children governed by both, and outlining the
risk factors which they may share. Although the relationship between foster
care and special education is bicausal, 15 my focus in this paper will be on chil-
dren who are already in out-of-home care and who could be better served by
accurate placement in appropriate special education programs or, alternatively,
who could be better served by a meaningful review of their situation and re-
moved from restrictive education settings where they do not belong. In Part II,
I consider the legal paradigms of normalcy, difference, and equality that gov-
ern children's access to family, a safe and stable home, and special education
services. These paradigms underlie rules and practices which serve as barriers
to the effective inclusion and empowerment of doubly at-risk children. Ap-
plying some critiques of traditional equal protection doctrine, I will argue that
the current framework does not allow children in out-of-home care meaningful
equality in special education. In Part III, I outline some steps that may em-
power children and facilitate their access to equality at home and at school.
The first step is the Article itself-in attempting to give voice to the unique
needs of children who are exceptional both at home and at school, I hope to
contribute to a dialogue among teachers, youth, social workers, parents and ad-
vocates that can move us toward ensuring equality for all of our children.
13. School personnel may try to obtain approval to evaluate a child for special education referral
without parental consent by initiating a due process hearing, dependent upon state law. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(ii) (West 2000). However, the default is often not to evaluate and refer children with-
out parental advocacy, let alone without parental consent.
14. See further discussion of this point, infra at Part I.C.
15. For instance, children with disabilities making them eligible for special education are more
likely to be abused than children without disabilities. See The Beach Center on Families and Disability,
University of Kansas, How To: Reduce Abuse and Neglect of Children With Disabilities (citing a Na-
tional Council on Abuse and Neglect study finding that children with disabilities experience abuse and
neglect up to 1.7 times more often than other children).
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I. ADEQUATE CARE AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL: THE INTERACTION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND SPECIAL EDUCATION
A. Foster Care Overview
The failure to protect children from intrafamily abuse and neglect and the
concomitant dramatic increase in children placed in out-of-home care is a na-
tional "emergency. ' 6 The number of abused and neglected children has risen
at astonishing rates in the last decade, 17 resulting in the abuse or neglect of over
three million children in 1996.18 Children have also been removed from their
homes into foster care at a rapidly increasing rate. 9 Yet there is often diffi-
culty finding a safe and stable place for them to live, as the number of family
foster care providers has decreased recently. 20 The lack of long-term solutions
via either reunification or alternative permanency plans, such as adoption,
means that most children languish in foster care "limbo" 21 far longer than the
legal maximum of eighteen months. Children in foster care are sometimes
further abused in placement23 and are often traumatized by the instability and
frequent changes in placement associated with out-of-home care.
This Part will outline the federal statutory scheme governing the out-of-
home placement of children in state custody and describe the often seemingly
irreconcilable policies of family preservation and permanency planning (in-
cluding termination of parental rights and adoption) that underlie the federal
approach. A brief profile of the children in foster care will conclude this Part.
16. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, U.S. ADVISORY BOARD ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, THE CONTINUING CHILD
PROTECTION EMERGENCY: A CHALLENGE TO THE NATION (1993) [hereinafter A CHALLENGE TO THE
NATION].
17. Howard A. Davidson, Applying an International Innovation to Help U.S. Children: The Child
Welfare Ombudsman, 28 FAM. L. Q. 117, 120 (Spring 1994) (stating that reports of child abuse rose by
50 percent between 1985 and 1992).
18. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5 at 3. See also THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE
STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN: YEARBOOK 1997 51 (1997) [hereinafter C.D.F. YEARBOOK 1997].
19. The number of children in out-of-home care increased by 89.5% from 1987 to 1996. 1999
CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 72.
20. Id. (postulating that the number of foster care providers may be rising again).
21. This term was used by the Supreme Court in recognizing the problem of lengthy and multiple
foster care placements in contrast to statutory aim of temporary care. See Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S.
816, 836 (1976) (citing Professor Robert Mnookin).
22. Out of an estimated 600,000 children in care, it is estimated that 40,000-80, 000 have been
freed for adoption but remain unadopted. See Jill Sheldon, 50, 000 Children Are Waiting: Permanency
Planning and Termination of Parental Rights Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, 17 BCWLJ 73 (1997). A study by the American Civil Liberties Union reported that 1 in 10 chil-
dren remains in foster care for over 7.4 years. Children in the system live with three different families
on average, although many are in over ten placements. Id. at 100, n.263.
23. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 31.
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1. The Statutory Basis for Child Protection Through Out-of Home
Placement: The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.
Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
198024 (hereinafter AACWA) to decrease the number of children in foster care
and minimize the length of stay in placement. AACWA aimed to accomplish
this by increasing permanency planning for children, particularly through an
emphasis on family preservation coupled with the termination of parental
rights only if necessary after the failure of concerted efforts toward family
preservation.25 This legislation followed the Supreme Court's acknowledge-
ment of the 'foster care drift' problem in Smith v. OFFER,26 documentation of
the psychological harm that children may experience when they lack a perma-
nent placement, 27 and a federal study reporting that the average length of fos-
ter placement was two and a half years, with thirty-eight per cent of children
staying in foster care over two years.28 AACWA embodied an effort to unify
child protection under certain national standards.29 These national standards
were imposed through the conditioning of federal funding on the states' crea-
tion of programs to help at-risk families avoid removal of children from their
homes.30 To this end, a major component of the legislation required states to
make "reasonable efforts" to reunite families before terminating parental
rights.3'
Yet, more children with more serious needs have been placed in the foster
32care system since AACWA was enacted. Further, many of the children being
placed in the foster care system never achieve a permanent home due to failed
family reunification attempts (including a lack of proper family supports) and a
24. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 4 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 1448 (codified as amended in sections of
42 U.S.C.).
25. S. REP. No. 96-336, at. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1440, 1450.
26. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 836-37 (1976) (recognizing that foster children in New York
state were spending over four years in foster care on average, with most in at least two placements).
27. One very influential work in this field argues that every child needs a "psychological parent"
for healthy emotional development, which is rarely achieved in foster care placement, and is usually
best left to the biological parent(s). JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
28. S. REP. NO. 96-336, supra note 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1459-60 (discussing the
1977 Department of Health, Education and Welfare "National Study of Social Services to Children and
Their Families").
29. Sheldon, supra note 22 at 77 (citing children's advocate Martin Guggenheim).
30. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a) (West Supp. 2000). Note
that the Act was amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act discussed infra text accompanying
note 39.
31. 42 U.S.C.A. §671(a) (West Supp. 2000).
32. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 72.
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lack of adoptive families. 33 Both AACWA and the foster care system garnered
widespread criticism. Foster care was, and continues to be, decried as futile
and incredibly cost inefficient. Those involved in the foster care system at all
levels-from child protective caseworkers to judicial court judges-have been
criticized for not adequately protecting children and not ensuring them stable
homes and families.34 Commentators argued for different solutions, ranging
from a focus on child safety above family preservation, 35 often including an
expedited termination of parental rights and greater subsidies and support for
adoption, 36 to increased support services for families combined with pro-
adoption measures.
37
In response to some of the failures of the child welfare system under
AACWA, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(hereinafter ASFA).38 ASFA represents a major shift from the family preser-
vation philosophy embodied in AACWA. While AACWA prioritized family
preservation, ASFA prioritizes children's safety and permanency planning
39
through quicker and easier adoptions.40 ASFA posits a "dual track" child wel-
fare system wherein states may (in theory at least) simultaneously satisfy the
requisite due process of a child's biological parents while also seeking out po-
tential adoptive families. 4 1 The permanency planning goal is met by acceler-
ating permanency planning hearings, now required after twelve instead of
eighteen months,42 and mandating the initiation of termination of parental
rights proceedings for any child in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two
months (with very limited exceptions). 43 For the first time, states are given fi-
nancial incentives to increase adoptions, thus decreasing the number of chil-
33. Sheldon, supra note 22, at 80-82 (reporting on a study by Guggenheim finding an increase in
new York's foster care population between 1987 and 1991 and a 73% increase in Michigan's between
1986 and 1992, combined in both states with increased rates of termination of parental rights and in-
creasing numbers of children available for adoption, yet not adopted).
34. E.g., Jill Smolowe, Making the Tough Calls, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 40-44.
35. E.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE 143 (1995).
36. One adoption incentive project created by former foster youth Conna Craig, Assignment:
Adoption, was successfully adopted in Massachusetts resulting in an increase in the number of adop-
tions from 599 to 1068 in two years. Sheldon, supra note 22, at 92-97. Massachusetts has continued to
increase its adoption rate, placing 4500 foster children from 1993-97, almost double the placement rate
for the previous four years. Bob Hohler, Opening A Door to 'Stable, Loving' Homes " Clinton Signs Law
To Make Safety of Children Top Priority in Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1997, at Al.
37. Donald N. Duquette et al., We Know Better Than We Do: A Framework for Child Welfare Re-
form, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93 (1997).
38. Pub. L. No. 105-89 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2000)).
39. E.g., Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 671(a)(15) (West Supp. 2000) (stating
that "in making such reasonable efforts, the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern").
40. Id. § 673 (providing adoption incentive payments).
41. Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15) (West Supp. 2000) Adoption and
Safe Families Act (providing that family preservation "reasonable efforts" may be made simultaneously
with efforts to place children with adoptive parents or guardians).
42. Id. § 675(5)(A)(ii).
43. Id. § 65(5)(E).
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dren in long-term foster care. 4 Congress has lowered the threshold for parents
to prove themselves incapable of caring for their children and reduced the req-
uisite amount of "reasonable effort" that states must make toward family pres-
ervation in extreme cases of abuse and neglect.45 Finally, foster parents, pre-
adoptive parents, and relative caregivers are newly granted the right to notice
of foster care reviews and hearings, although they are not accorded full party
status.4 6
Child welfare law and practice in many states anticipated and predated
these federal legislative trends and, as a result, the aforementioned federal
framework is augmented by some ad hoc, regional approaches. For instance,
the often futile search for adoptive families and the attachment of children to
long-term foster families has led to recognition of a "fostadoption" hybrid in
some states wherein foster parents are simultaneously pre-adoptive parents.4 7
This goes against years of child welfare policy pretending that foster care was
exclusively a short-term placement. 48 Many states also passed legislation ex-
pediting permanency planning and facilitating the termination of parental
rights.49 Subsidized and standby guardianships, as well as increasing support
of non-foster kinship care, have also been used by states to help children
achieve stable and long-term homes.
50
The development of the federal statutory framework and state practice and
procedure is important because children and youth have very few, if any, sub-
stantive rights under the child protection system. Unlike the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) governing special education, 51 the statutes
governing out-of-home placement do not create enforceable rights in private
parties. 52 Children also have no right to protection from abusive parents, even
if the child protection agency is involved with their family and aware of the
risk.53 Nonetheless, the shift in philosophy of federal child welfare policy and
44. Id. § 670.
45. Id. § 671(a)(15).
46. Bill Grimm, Adoption and Safe Families Act Brings Big Changes in Child Welfare, 18 YOUTH
LAW NEWS 1, 5 (Nov.-Dec. 1997).
47. Mireya Navvaro, Battle for Baby J: Foster Mother Fights Family for Permanent Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A12.
48. "Fost-adopt" foster families, however, do not have increased legal protection of their relation-
ships despite their hybrid role. Thus, children are still vulnerable to transfers in placement and a lack of
permanency. For further discussion, see infra Part II.B.
49. States include Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Illinois. The state reforms follow sev-
eral particularly tragic deaths from child abuse attributed to systemic inabilities to adequately protect
children under current law. See Johnathan Rabinowitz, Rowland Plan Would Ease Early Adoption in
Abuse Cases, N.Y. TIMES, January 5, 1996, at BI. See also Duquette et al., supra note 37, at 134-35.
50. See C.D.F. YEARBOOK 1997, supra note 18, at 56.
51. See discussion infra Part I.B.
52. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
53. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that
a county has no duty under the due process clause to protect a child against violence from a parent). For
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state practice and procedure to a permanency planning and child safety focus
may increase the capacity of foster parents and others working with children in
out-of-home care to advocate for the effective educational placement of these
children.
2. A Profile of Children in Out-of-Home Care
About 716,000 children are in out-of-home care for at least part of each
year, and this number is increasing rapidly.54 Children with disabilities are
vastly over represented in out-of-home care-the prevalence of disability
among children in foster care is double that of the general school-age popula-
tion.55 This corresponds with the higher rates of abuse of children with dis-
abilities, possibly due to added parental stress, both emotional and financial, in
dealing with a child with a disability, and to feelings of isolation from the
community. 56 The disabilities among children in out-of-home care, however,
might also be due to the abuse and neglect which led to their placement in the
child welfare system.
Poor children and children from certain racial groups and are also substan-
tially over represented in foster care.57 For instance, fifteen per cent of all
children are African-American, while 44 percent of children in out-of home
care are African-American. 58 Native American children are likewise over rep-
resented in foster care, while Caucasian, Latino and Asian children are under-
represented. 59 Children of color are also more likely to have longer place-
ments in foster care than other children.6 °
Children and youth in out-of-home care of all abilities and races are at-risk
for social and economic disadvantage both as youth or as adults. Children who
have been abused or neglected, many of whom are in out-of-home care, are up
to sixty-seven times more likely to be arrested for delinquent behavior between
further discussion of this case and its impact on the equality children in out-of-home care, see infra Part
II.C.
54. These numbers are for 1996, and represent a 89.5% increase from 1987. 1999 CWLA STAT
BOOK, supra note 5, at 72.
55. Karen Shelley Smucker et al., School-Related Problems of Special Education Foster-Care
Students with Emotional or Behavioral Disorders: A Comparison to Other Groups, 4 J. EMOTIONAL &
BEHAV. DISORDERS 30 (1996).
56. Beach Center on Families and Disability, supra note 15; See also Matthew B. Bogin & Beth
Goodman, Special Education for Children in State Custody, 7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 8, 10 (1986).
57. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 110, 229. Of note, the over-representation of chil-
dren from low income families may result in part from higher reporting among low income families.
58. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 95.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 110 (discussing children of color), 229 (discussing low-income children). The latter may
be due to higher reporting among low income families, but the CWLA also asserts that abuse and ne-
glect occurs more often in low income families due to the stressful nature of these environments.
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the ages of nine and twelve than other children.6 1 The younger a child is when
he or she is first arraigned, the greater the chance of future arrests, including as
an adult. 62 Studies across the country have found that between thirty and forty
percent of foster care graduates almost immediately become dependent on so-
cial assistance.63 Former foster youth are also at risk for homelessness and
long-term poverty.64 Although many children in out-of-home care demonstrate
no long term differences from other children, 65 many are extremely vulnerable
to future harm and stigmatization.
Understanding the group characteristics of children in out-of-home care is
relevant to our discussion of these children's experience in the education sys-
tem because the racial, socioeconomic, and behavioral attributes of these chil-
dren may influence their treatment in the education system. For example, the
bias of many social service workers regarding race and economic status leads
to the overrepresentation of certain children in foster care, just as the bias of
many educational professionals against children in the foster care system leads
to the latter's disproportional presence in the special education system.
66
B. Special Education Overview
1. The Statutory Basis for Special Education: The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act
Federal law guarantees each child deemed to have "special needs" 67 a
"free appropriate public education" (FAPE).6 8 This entitlement was created to
prevent the exclusion of disabled children from education. 69 Before school
districts were legally required to educate children with disabilities in the 1970s,
up to one million children were excluded from the public schools altogether,
while another three and a half million were being denied public schooling ap-
propriate to their needs.
70
Two pivotal cases in the early 1970s first highlighted the large number of
61. Child Welfare League of America, News Release, Study Shows Children Reported Abused and
Neglected Are 67 Times More Likely to be Arrested as Pre-Teens, June 19, 1997.
62. 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 5, at 238 (reporting that a child who first appears in court
at age ten has a ninety-six percent chance of committing future offenses, while a child committing his
first offense at age seventeen has only a thirty-six percent chance of committing future offenses).
63. Sheldon, supra note 22, at 98-99.
64. Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: A Due Process Perspective, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 271, 278 (1993).
65. Id. at 278-79.
66. For further discussion of this issue, see infra note 141 and accompanying text.
67. To be eligible for special education, a child must be educationally assessed to be a "child with
a disability" as defined in IDEA. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3) (West 2000). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1)
(specifying further the definition of disability for special education eligibility).
68. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400(d)(l)(A), 1412(a)(1) (West 2000).
69. S. REP No. 94-168, at 8 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432.
70. H.R. REP. NO. 93-805, at 50 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4093.
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disabled children who were not permitted to enroll in the public school system:
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania71
and Mills v. Board of Education.72 In both cases, a federal court held that
equal protection requires that children with disabilities be accorded the same
access to a public education as other children, and that parents have due
process rights related to their child's education.73 To this end, the courts in
PARC and Mills laid out procedural mechanisms for school districts to
follow. 74 Congress responded to this concern for educational protections for
disabled children with two pieces of legislation, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act 75 and, most significantly, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, now the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).76 The educational access right of children with disabilities, and
the concomitant process of creating individualized education plans for these
exceptional children, have been expanded over the years through both case
law77 and statute.78
While Section 504 forbids any entity receiving federal funding from dis-
criminating against people with disabilities in its provision of services,79 its
lack of related funding or monitoring means that it is often disregarded by state
and local educational agencies. 8 IDEA, a federal funding statute like the child
welfare legislation discussed above, is thus the most powerful guarantor of the
educational rights of exceptional children. Most recently revised by Congress
in 1997, IDEA promises every child with special needs a free, appropriate, and
least restrictive educational placement. 8 It guarantees this promise through
71. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
72. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
73. PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.Supp. at 1259-60 & 1264; Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.Supp. at
875-76.
74. PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. at 1260-62; Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.Supp. at 878-81.
75. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355(1973).
76. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (West 2000) as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-17 (1997). The Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, Pub L. No. 94-142, was originally passed in 1975.
77. Within one year of Mills, over 30 federal court decisions upheld the principles expressed in
Mills and PARC. See CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL
EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (Spring 1996) available at
http://www.futureofchildren.org [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION]. Many
decisions since then have further elaborated and expanded upon the educational rights of disabled chil-
dren.
78. Congress most recently amended IDEA in 1997. See supra note 76. Many states preceded the
federal government in legislating educational rights and protections for disabled children, although
many of these were not adequately enforced. Edwin M. Martin et al., The Legislative and Litigation
History of Special Education, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 26-28.
79. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), passed in 1990, greatly expands the rights af-
forded to disabled people by banning discrimination in employment, public accommodations, transpor-
tation and telecommunications. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990). It is now being used by parents and advocates to expand and enforce the rights of children
in special education. See THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 29.
80. THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77.
81. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(C)(ii) (West 2000).
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due process parental rights to be enforced via parental advocacy. 82 Schools are
not, however, responsible for maximizing the educational outcomes of excep-
tional children. The Supreme Court has made it clear that satisfaction of a
child's special education right is met by minimum equality of access, rather
than by facilitating equality of outcomes or educational potential.83 Thus,
compliance with special education mandates is often focused on meeting pro-
cedural requirements as opposed to outcome goals.
IDEA requires that each eligible child receive a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) possible. The
scope of these requirements is determined based upon the unique needs of the
child. The individualized nature of the entitlement means that there are no
bright-line rules but rather a balancing test that must be carried out by educa-
tors, administrative hearing officers and judges. A state's receipt of federal
funding under IDEA is contingent on that state maintaining a multi-layered
system of procedural mechanisms, including state and local school district
"child find" obligations to identify all children with disabilities, 84 and an an-
nual meeting to create an individualized education program (IEP) for each ex-
ceptional child.85 The process of formulating the IEPs brings parents and
school officials together in considering the needs of each disabled child and
lies at the heart of IDEA.86 An IEP must consider more than the child's aca-
demic needs. It must also evaluate skills necessary to socialization, mental
health stability, and transition to adulthood.
7
IDEA also entitles exceptional children to the provision of services related
to their ability to benefit from their special education placement,88 although the
scope of this requirement is somewhat unclear. A school district is required to
provide:
transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as
are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and
includes speech-language pathology and audiology services, psychological serv-
ices, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation,
early identification and assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services,
including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and mobility services, and medical
services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. The term also includes school health
services, social work services in schools, and parent counseling and training.
89
82. Id. § 1415. See infra Part II.C for further discussion of the parental rights framework under-
lying IDEA.
83. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). See further discussion of this case infra at
Part II.C.
84. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(3) (West 2000).
85. Id. § 1414(d).
86. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
87. E.g. Howard S. v. Friendswood Independent School District, 454 F. Supp. 634 (1978).
88. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(a) (1999).
89. Id.
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The list above is not intended to be exhaustive, and the number of related
services has increased over the years, as local education agencies (LEAs),
courts, and the Department of Education continue to recognize the holistic and
interdependent nature of an exceptional child's needs. 91 It is not always clear,
however, which services are "educationally necessary" and which are neces-
sary for other ends. The Supreme Court outlined its designation of a related
service covered under IDEA as distinguished from an uncompensable medical
service in Irving Independent School District v. Tatro.92 The Court required a
school to provide intermittent catheterization of a child with spina bifida, rea-
soning that "[a] service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school
during the day is an important means of providing the child with the meaning-
ful access to education that Congress envisioned., 93 Due to scarce resources,
however, LEAs often assert that related services not traditionally provided by
schools, such as parental counseling and complex health services, are not edu-
cationally necessary. These assertions frequently go unchallenged.94
This is of special concern with regard to children in out-of-home care be-
cause many of the "related services" ostensibly encompassed in this duty by
educational agencies are very relevant to the needs of children in out-of-home
care, such as psychological services, transportation, counseling, physical and
occupational therapy, and social work services. Transportation, for instance,
includes transportation to and from school, 95 which may be applicable to chil-
dren in out-of-home care who are moved far from their school but require the
stability of educational placement in order to benefit from special education
services. Psychological services are frequently necessary for children having
experienced abuse, neglect or the trauma of removal from the home. Courts
have found psychiatric therapy to be a related service--even though it was be-
ing provided by a medical practitioner-and thus was potentially excludable
under the IDEA regulations. 96 A child does not need to be diagnosed as hav-
ing SED to receive such services; they are available to all exceptional chil-
dren.97 Social work services, whether with the child alone or with the family
or foster family, are frequently necessary for a child in out-of-home care to
benefit from her special education placement. The federal regulation explicitly
includes services apparently directly suited to the needs of these children such
90. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. A, at 66 (1999).
91. STEPHEN B. THOMAS & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: ISSUES &
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE '90s 72 (1995).
92. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
93. Id at 891.
94. COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION & PROTECTION & ADVOCACY, INC.,
SPECIAL EDUCATION RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES ch. 5 (February 2000) available at http://www.pai-
ca.org/pubs/401601 .htm.
95. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(15) (1999).
96. See THOMAS & RUSSO, supra note 91, at 76-77 (discussing cases).
97. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 21.
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as "(iii) [w]orking in partnership with parents and others on those problems in
a child's living situation (home, school, and community) that affect the child's
adjustment in school" and "(iv) [m]obilizing school and community resources
to enable the child to learn as effectively as possible in his or her educational
program. ' 98 For children in out-of-home care, the "related services" provision
potentially may be utilized to assist them achieve the stability and equality of
opportunity that they often lack in terms of special education services. 99 How-
ever, because of the lack of clarity regarding the scope of the "related services"
provision and the reluctance of cash-poor schools to provide such services, this
provision has yet to be used to its fullest in benefiting exceptional children in
out-of-home care.
Finally, from an enforcement perspective, IDEA functions by granting pro-
cedural rights to the parents of exceptional children. These include the right to
consent to or decline an evaluation and placement of their child, examine the
records regarding their child, receive written notice of placement changes, at-
tend meetings regarding their child's placement and provide input into the IEP,
and the right to appeal or be referred to mediation with regard to any placement
change.100 IDEA regulations mandate that states and LEAs take many steps to
encourage parental participation in the development and implementation of a
child's IEP, including providing advance notice and scheduling meetings at
mutually-agreed upon locations and times, using other methods such as tele-
phone conference calls to allow parents unable to meet a chance to participate,
and documenting their efforts to encourage parental participation. 10 1 This
system of procedural protections has been criticized for encouraging adversar-
ial relationships between schools and parents.0 2 Moreover, many parents
know little about their rights under IDEA, despite the requirement on schools
to inform them, and some feel that schools routinely exploit this lack of knowl-
edge to violate the law. 10 3 Nonetheless, the system has also been praised for
giving parents leverage to ensure an adequate placement for their children.'°4
2. Profile of Exceptional Children
One in every ten public school students receives special education services,
totaling about six million children in 1995-96.'°5 The number, both absolute
98. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.24(b)(13)(iii)-(iv) (1999).
99. For further discussion, see infra Part III.C.
100. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 2000). The parental rights framework of IDEA is discussed fur-
ther infra Part II.C.
101. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a) (1999).
102. Martin et. al, supra note 78, at 31.
103. Id.
104. Martha Minow, Learning To Live With the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special
Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 177 (1985) [hereinafter Minow, Bilingual and Special
Education].
105. THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, Executive Summary.
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and relative, of students with disabilities has grown from the mid-1970s when
special education was first implemented. 0 6 This growth is attributed most per-
suasively to increases in social and physical stresses on children resulting from
poverty, substance abuse, and family dysfunction, 10 7 notably the same stresses
often affecting children in out-of-home-placement regardless of their eligibility
for special education.1
0 8
The majority of children and youth covered under IDEA in grades K-12, 51
percent, receive services because of a learning disability (LD). °9 The break-
down of disabilities among other students receiving special education is as
follows: twenty-two percent have speech or language impairments; eleven per-
cent have mental retardation; nine percent are eligible because of SED; and
seven percent have hearing or visual impairments, orthopedic impairments, et
cetera.1 10 Thus, almost all of the children receiving special education services
do not fit the model of discrete and immutable physical impairment which un-
derlies the statutory framework."' The more subjective nature of identifica-
tion of these mutable disabilities is significant because it increases the potential
impact of bias against children in out-of-home care. Specifically, children in
out-of-home care may be mistakenly labeled as having one of these mutable
disabilities merely as a result of their deviation from societal norms.
Like children in foster care, children living in poverty are over-represented
in special education." 2 This occurs despite the fact that IDEA explicitly ex-
cludes from its coverage children whose learning disabilities are primarily due
to "environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage," 113 relying in part on
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 14 to meet this
need."15 However, it is arguably impossible to separate out the detrimental ef-
fects of poverty on a child's development.116 The recent amendments to IDEA
106. Daniel P. Hallahan & James M. Kauffman, Toward A Culture of Disability in the Aftermath
of Deno and Dunn, 27 J. OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 496, 498 (1994).
107. Daniel P. Hallahan, Some Thoughts on Why the Prevalence of Learning Disabilities Has In-
creased, 25 J. OF LEARNING DISABILITIES 523, 523-28 (1992).
108. See infra Part I.C discussing the overlap between children in out-of-home care and children
who are at-risk educationally.
109. These numbers are from 1992-93. See Special Education for Students with Disabilities:
Analysis and Recommendations, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at
7.
110. Id.
11. Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's Perspective
and Proposalfor Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 331, 358-60 (1994) (Citing the extent and range of
children with non-permanent disabilities to argue for increased inclusion, a focus on outcomes and mo-
bility out of special education).
112. Special Education for Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 6.
113. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(10)(ii) (1999).
114. 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (West 2000).
115. Special Education for Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 6-7.
116. Id. at7.
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funding scheme implicitly recognize the correlation between poverty and the
need for special education by granting some funds on the basis of the state's
population of children living in poverty. 117 While there are a number of con-
siderations that help to explain the disproportionately high percentage of chil-
dren living in poverty who are also receiving special education services, the
overrepresentation also demonstrates again that subjective biases, against chil-
dren from low-income backgrounds, children of color, or children in out-of-
home care, may result in higher identification of these children as disabled for
special education purposes.
Students identified as having disabilities are more likely to be African-
American, and less likely to be Hispanic, than their relative numbers in the
general population.' 18 As is the case with the overrepresentation of children in
out-of-home care, one factor underlying this data is the cultural and racial bias
informing assessment methods and the assessors themselves.119 Although
states are required to ensure that assessment and evaluation procedures are not
discriminatory on a racial or cultural basis,1 20 there are persuasive arguments
that this racially disparate over-identification is in large part due to racist so-
cietal and legal constructions of disability and achievement which inform the
assessment and evaluation tools and underlie the system of special education
itself. 121
Exceptional children are at high risk for delinquency and incarceration,
122
dropping out of school, and other harms. Nationwide, eight percent of excep-
tional children drop out before beginning high school, and another thirty per-
cent drop out during high school. Students with mental retardation and SED
are the least likely to attend post secondary education or to achieve the average
rate of employment. Students doubly disadvantaged by poverty and disability
fare the worst. 123
117. 20 U.S.C.A. § 141 l(e)(3)(A)(i)(III) (West 2000).
118. Special Education for Students with Disabilities: Analysis and Recommendations, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 6-7.
119. Daniel J. Reschly, Identification and Assessment of Students with Disabilities, THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 40, 47-48.
120. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b)(3) (West 2000).
121. Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 1237 (1995) [hereinafter Glannon, Race, Education].
122. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 31-32 (reporting that studies show that between 28 and 46
percent of delinquent children have at least one disability as defined under IDEA and that up to 42 to 60
percent of incarcerated juveniles have previously been identified as needing special education services).
The link between learning disability and juvenile delinquency has been extensively studied, much more
so than the related link between dependency and disability.
123. All of the above information comes from a report of the National Longitudinal Transition
Study of Special Education Students. See Mary M. Wagner & Jose Blackorby, Transition From High
School to Work or College: How Special Education Students Fare, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL
EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 103-20.
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C. Children at the Intersection1 24 of Foster Care and Special Education
This Article is focused on the intersectional children that are served by both
the foster care and special education systems.125 The lack of adequate infor-
mation and service provision for the educational needs of children in the foster
care system impacts both their school and home placements. Without assis-
tance, few of these children will leave the child welfare system performing
better educationally than when they entered. 126 Many of the risk factors mag-
nifying the disadvantages of these intersectional children and youth appear to
be due to, or exacerbated by, the contrasting mandates and gaps in service be-
tween the child protection and special education systems. Thus, the relation-
ship between these systems and the social workers and teachers working
therein must be studied in order to suggest some causal factors for, and ways to
address, the alarming overlap between exceptional children and children in out-
of-home care.
1. Prevalence of Foster Children At-Riskfor Restrictive Educational
Placement
There is a very substantial correlation between children in out-of-home
care and children at-risk for educational problems. 127 Children in foster care
have been assessed as having poorer cognitive abilities and lower levels of
academic performance than their peers, often resulting in placement at below
age-appropriate grade level. 28 One study of children in kinship care' 29 found
that they scored significantly under peer level in reading, math, and cognitive
abilities, and that forty-one percent of the foster children had been retained at
least one grade level.13  Other studies have found that children in long-term
foster care have a substantially lower chance of performing at or above grade
124. Kimberl6 Crenshaw uses the term "intersectionality" to describe the unique status of indi-
viduals falling into more than one disadvantaged group, such as Black women. See KimberlM Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 383,
383-95 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
125. Robert M. George et al., Special-Education Experiences of Foster Children: An Empirical
Study, 71 CHILD WELFARE 419, 424 (Sept.-Oct. 1992) (reporting one study finding that about thirty per-
cent of children in out-of-home care receive special education services versus the ten percent national
average among all children).
126. WARBOYS ETAL., supra note 4, at 78.
127. The high presence of other educational risk factors among children in foster care, including
socioeconomic status and race, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text, may further increase this
correlation among dependency and special education.
128. See studies cited in Sandra J. Altshuler, A Reveille for School Social Workers: Children in
Foster Care Need Our Help!, 19 SOCIAL WORK IN EDUCATION 121, 122 (Apr. 1997).
129. In kinship foster care, a child is placed with his or her relatives. It should be noted that this is
often the best situation for foster children in terms of stability and development, so these numbers could
be even higher for children in more restrictive, i.e. less family-like, and less stable placements.
130. Richard J. Sawyer & Howard Dubowitz, School Performance of Children in Kinship Care, 18
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 587, 591 (1994).
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level than other children.'131
Children in out-of-home care not only under-perform their peers in aca-
demic skill assessments, 132 but also demonstrate greater levels of behavioral
disorders and higher rates of absenteeism. 133 Teachers characterize children in
out-of-home care as more problematic than other children in several re-
spects.' 34 One study found that teachers described "foster children" as having
"poor or very poor" study habits and attention skills, as well as "major" be-
havioral problems, including acting out, aggression, and frequent demands for
attention.135 Further, within this general framework, there is a hierarchy of
educational risk among foster children related to the stability of their situation.
For instance, one study in Oregon found that children who experienced multi-
ple foster placements throughout a school year had a lower chance of being
above grade level or being engaged in extracurricular activities at school than
children in more stable long-term foster placements.
136
The educational problems that children in out-of-home care experience is
reflected in their higher rates of referral to special education--over three times
more often than children not in foster care.' 37 A study in Baltimore found that
almost thirty percent of children in kinship foster care were in special educa-
tion programs, 138 and about thirty-two percent of foster children in Chicago
were found to be in special education programs, in both instances much higher
than the national special education rate of only ten percent.' 39 Children in out-
of-home care are particularly likely to have certain disabilities qualifying for
special education including mental retardation--eighteen percent versus the
one to two percent rate among all children-and severe emotional disability-
thirteen to sixty-six percent versus the incidence rate of two to five percent
131. Robert H. Ayasse, Addressing the Needs of Foster Children: The Foster Youth Services Pro-
gram, 17 SOCIAL WORK IN EDUCATION 207, 208 (1995) (reporting on a study by the Children's Service
Division of Oregon, J. White et al., A Study of the Educational Status of Foster Children in Oregon:
Research and Statistics (1990) [hereinafter Oregon study]).
132. Some of the performance differential may be a result of bias in the testing system or testers
themselves. This is a significant area for change, as discussed further infra Part III, but until this hap-
pens the underperformance of children in out-of-home care in such assessments is cause for concern
regardless of the cause because it demonstrates that the needs and strengths of these children are not
accounted for in the current school structure.
133. Altshuler, supra note 128, at 122.
134. This may in part be due to stigmatizing stereotypes by teachers about children in out-of-home
care. See generally Cormier, supra note 7. This prejudice and ignorance then form a barrier to effective
education of children in out-of-home care.
135. Sawyer & Dubowitz, supra note 130, at 587-97.
136. Id. See also Ayasse, supra note 131, at 208 (reporting on Oregon study).
137. See George et al., supra note 125, at 424. This high prevalence also appears in other locali-
ties. For instance, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services estimates that twenty to forty per-
cent of the approximately 20,000 children in foster care in Massachusetts are in special education pro-
grams. Telephone interview with Susan Stalk, the D.S.S. administrator in charge of coordination with
Boston Public Schools (April 1997).
138. Sawyer & Dubowitz, supra note 130, at 590.
139. George et al., supra note 125, at 424.
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among all children.' 40 .,,
(a) The Risk of Mistaken Identification for Special Education Referrals of
Children in Out-of-Home Care
Children in out-of-home care are more likely than other children to be
mistakenly identified for special education purposes-both over-identified and
under-identified for services-because of the problematic disjunct between the
overlapping special education and child welfare systems. Both outcomes are
harmful--either by forcing children into an overly restrictive and potentially
stigmatizing educational environment, or by denying them the special services
that they need and to which they are entitled.
Over identification results from teachers and other personnel being more
likely to make referrals in the case of foster children because biases against
children in out-of-home care as a group, lack of information about an individ-
ual child's home situation, and/or lack of understanding about a child's needs
and abilities all affect the inherently subjective assessment process. 141 Finally,
the potential for over identification of children in out-of-home care is com-
pounded by the high number of children of color and poor children in the child
welfare system, who are further impacted by evaluators' biases based on race
and class.
Over identification can have long-term detrimental effects on a child's
reputation among peers, teachers, and future employers. 142 The harms of being
identified as in need of special education were recognized in one settlement
where children in out-of-home care were referenced without the benefit of due
process and IDEA procedural safeguards to special education programs. The
consent decree therein requires the local educational agency to expunge all
special education information from the records of all children who were not
properly identified or who were not appointed surrogate parents to advocate for
them.
143
140. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 39. The latter point regarding SED is discussed at greater
length infra notes 155-173 and accompanying text.
141. Cormier, supra note 7. At least one suit alleged that all children placed in shelters, group
homes and residential institutions were automatically labeled "behavior disordered . . . regardless of
their educational needs." See Katie I., et al. v. Ted Kimbrough, et al., Consent Decree No. 89 C 8584, in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (1991) at 2-3
[hereinafter Katie L Consent Decree], on file with author due to the very kind assistance of Adrienne
Giorgolo in the Public Guardian's Office of Cook County, Juvenile Division.
142. The harms of being identified for special education services without an individualized as-
sessment or due process under IDEA were recognized in the Katie I. settlement, which includes as part
of the consent decree the expunging of special education information from the records of all children
who were not properly identified or who were not appointed a surrogate parent to advocate for them.
Katie L Consent Decree, id. at 8-9.
143. Id. An analogous right to freedom from reputational harm in part motivated the Supreme
Court's requirements of some due process in school suspensions, in Goss v. Lopez. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
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On the other hand, existing at the juncture of the special education and
child welfare systems puts children with disabilities in out-of-home care at
greater risk of under-identification, as well. Many factors cause this increased
risk. The absence of adult advocates in the educational system for foster chil-
dren-resulting from a lack of parental support and the prohibitions on other
adults, such as child protection workers, filling this role-and these children's
frequent changes of location mean that many do not receive the evaluations
and referrals that they require. Further, despite federal law' 44 and some state
law' 45 requiring that educational needs be taking into account in child welfare
case planning, child protective workers often do not or cannot make it a prior-
ity. Educators often rely on parents to advocate for their children, as laid out in
IDEA, and so may not focus on identifying special needs children themselves.
Personnel at schools and child protection agencies may either innocently
overlook indicators of a learning or other disability, or purposely overlook such
indicators to avoid the costs of furnishing testing and/or services. One study
found that although thirty-nine percent of foster children in Oregon had IEPs,
only sixteen percent were receiving any special education services. 46 Finally,
a lot of valuable information about a child's educational needs and history is
lost in frequent moves. Communication gaps and even antagonisms between
schools and child protection agencies exacerbate the under identification.
147
Some of the aforementioned factors may lead to either form of mistaken
labeling-over identification or under identification--depending upon the
situation. For instance, the funding structures of the special education and
child welfare systems sometimes result in the misidentification of children as
needing special education because service providers and advocates wish to ac-
cess federal IDEA funding, even though the children could be effectively
served in the less restrictive regular educational system, because there is inade-
quate general educational, child welfare, or other social service funding. Al-
ternatively, at other times the fact that state and local educational agencies
sometimes impose funding restrictions on children in special education means
that all eligible children are not identified, even though this contradicts the
child-find, free appropriate public education, and other central provisions of
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(16) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring that each foster child's case plan in-
clude his or her health or education records).
145. E.g., California Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures §§ 31-
420.15-17 (mandating that child protection agencies consider the appropriateness of maintaining a
child's current school placement, health and emotional issues, and special education needs, respectively,
in choosing a foster care placement), § 31-435.14-16 (requiring child protection agencies to consider in
permanency planning a child's special needs, the appropriateness of maintaining the current school
placement, and health and emotional factors).
146. Ayasse, supra note 131, at 208 (citing Oregon study).
147. George et al., supra note 125 (highlighting the enormous discrepancy between school and
child protection agency records; the former indicated that circa thirty percent of foster children received
special education services while the latter documented only five percent as receiving these services).
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(b) The Multi-factored Nature and Bi-Causation of Out-of-Home Placement
and Special Education Referral
The relationship between special education and foster placements is bicau-
sal- the reasons that children have trouble in educational settings may also
affect their home lives and vice versa. For instance, the higher rates of disabil-
ity and mental health needs among children in out-of-home care14 9 is one ma-
jor factor in their referrals out of the regular educational system. Children may
be disabled or have mental health needs due to abuse, neglect, or the fact of
out-of-home placement alone, and these disabilities and mental health needs
then have repercussions on their education. Alternatively, disabled children
can be more difficult to care for, and are substantially more likely to be abused
or neglected by parents or other adults.' 50 In the latter situation, a child may
have been at-risk for special education referral due to disability or mental
health needs before being removed from his or her home and entering out-of-
home care.
The end result is that children in both foster care and special education
programs are more at risk for academic and behavioral problems than children
in only one of these categories. 151 This extra risk is evidenced by the fact that
foster children in special education programs are almost five times more likely
to be in more restrictive placements-residential treatment centers and group
homes-than foster children in mainstream classrooms. 152 Although the rela-
tionship between a child's educational and residential placement is rarely con-
sidered, the two greatly impact each other. Stability, self-confidence, and
achievement in school are particularly important for children whose home life
is not secure. For instance, one study of foster care graduates found that the
youths who finished high school were more likely to secure employment and
achieve financial independence than those who didn't.' 53 The high prevalence
of foster children at risk for restrictive education placement is, in part, due to
148. For instance, California law allows cost to be taken into account in determining a child's
placement, without expressly stating that this is only permitted under IDEA when choosing between two
or more appropriate placements. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505(h) (West Supp. 2000).
149. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 31 (stating that a national study estimated 20.5% of chil-
dren in out-of-home care are disabled).
150. Children with disabilities are 1.7 times as likely to be abused or neglected as children without
disabilities. This statistic breaks down so that children with disabilities are 2.8 times as likely to suffer
emotional neglect, 1.8 times and 1.6 times as likely to suffer sexual abuse, and physical neglect respec-
tively. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4 at 32-33. Note also the long discriminatory and cruel history of
viewing the abuse of disabled people as appropriate treatment or punishment. E.g., JAMES M.
KAUFFMAN, CHARACTERISTICS OF BEHAVIOR DISORDERS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 46-48 (1989)
(discussing the history of neglect and abuse of children with emotional and behavioral disorders).
151. Smucker et al., supra note 55, at 31.
152. George et al., supra note 125, at 430.
153. Ayasse, supra note 131, at 209.
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the bicausal relationship between out-of-home placement and special education
needs and both must be taken into account to ensure that children obtain the
best possible residential and educational placements.
(c) The Subjectivity of Diagnosing Emotional and Behavioral Disorders
Foster children may also be at an unusually high risk of placement in re-
strictive education settings because they are often identified as suffering from
emotional and behavior disorders, which not only form a basis for reference to
special education, but are subjectively diagnosed. Those foster children termed
disabled or in need of special education are overwhelmingly identified as hav-
ing emotional or behavioral disorders154-up to fifty percent in some studies. '55
Foster children are about three to five times more likely to be termed SED than
children in the general population, and up to fifteen times more likely to be
identified as needing special education services as a result.'
56
Behavioral and emotional disorders are even more difficult to objectively
identify and assess than other disabilities, such as learning disabilities.
15 7
Definitions vary depending upon the definer and his, her, or its purpose.
58
IDEA, for example, uses the term "serious emotional disturbance" (SED), or
"emotional disturbance,"' 59 despite repeated attempts to change to the less-
stigmatizing and more accurately descriptive terms "behaviorally disor-
dered"'160 or "emotional and behavioral disorders."' 161 Identification is based
upon the presence of one or more factors, including a marked and lengthy in-
capacity to learn that cannot be explained by "intellectual, sensory, or health
factors," an "inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relation-
ships with peers and teachers," "[i]nappropriate types of behavior or feelings
under normal 162 circumstances," "pervasive" unhappiness or depression, or
"[a] tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal
or school problems."' 63 The definition specifically excludes children who are
"socially maladjusted."'164 This definition has proven difficult to apply and has
resulted in widely disparate state standards and concomitantly disparate esti-
154. Although "seriously emotionally disturbed" is the terminology under IDEA and its regula-
tions, I prefer to use "emotional and behavioral disorders" (EBD) as a less stigmatizing and more de-
scriptive term.
155. George et al., supra note 125, at 429.
156. Smucker et al., supra note 55, at 30.
157. KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 18-21. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the socially
constructed nature of disability and deviance.
158. Id.
159. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2000). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1) (1999).
160. KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 70.
161. WARBOYSETAL.,supra note 4, at6 & n. 16.
162. See infra Part II.A-B for a discussion of how normalcy is framed to exclude children in out-
of-home care.
163. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4)(i) (1999).
164. Id. § 300.7(c)(4)(ii).
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mated levels of emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) prevalence. 165
Even more so than with other categories of disability, the uncertain and
manipulable nature of the IDEA definition of behavior and emotional disorder
has led both to a significant under identification of children with EBD on a
systemic level, 166 and to a false identification and labeling of children on an
individual basis. The impossibility of distinguishing SED from "social mal-
adjustment," and the financial incentives that sometimes exist for not identify-
ing children who the local educational agency cannot afford to serve, 167 means
that children are not systemically screened for EBD, and emotionally disturbed
children often go unserved. Since many of the risk factors common to children
with EBD, such as "chaotic and disruptive homes," parents with "poor moth-
ering [or fathering] abilities," and "poor parent-child interactions,"' 168 are often
experienced by children in out-of-home care, it is likely that many children
whose EBD goes undiagnosed and/or untreated hail from the child welfare
system. Yet, in other instances there are inducements for over identification of
children with these behavioral tendencies as well. Because nearly every child
"at some time and in some social context" displays emotional or behavioral
problems, teachers may "mistake their own ineptitude in managing students"
for EBD, 169 or may evaluate children against the standards of a "normal" so-
cial environment which is very different from their reality-a particularly
likely problem with the assessment of children in out-of-home care.
Thus, many children in out-of-home care either have EBD or have behavior
tendencies easily misinterpreted as EBD. Children with EBD are among the
most marginalized of children needing special education services. The number
of children suffering from EBD is on the rise, while services vital to them, such
as Social Security Insurance (SSI), are being cut. 17 0 These children can disrupt
the classroom far more than children with physical or cognitive disabilities and
tend to be the most difficult for teachers to deal with. Studies show that teach-
ers have the most negative attitudes toward this group of children and place
them in segregated settings more quickly than more withdrawn children.1 7 1 As
a result, children with EBD are included in general education less than children
165. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 6; see also KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 23-27.
166. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 6; see also KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 23-27, 38-39
(stating that a very conservative national estimate of children requiring special education services for
EBD is about three to six per cent, but that only about one percent receive services.)
167. The LEA must provide special education services for every child it identifies as eligible, so
there is arguably a disincentive to the full identification of children with disabilities.
168. NIKKI MANGANORE, RISK FACTORS IN STUDENTS WITH BEHAVIORAL AND EMOTIONAL
DISORDERS for H-385. (1997) (On file with the author). See also KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 162
(stating that family characteristics interact with other environmental factors, such as poverty, to affect a
child's chances of having an EBD).
169. KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 30.
170. C.D.F. YEARBOOK 1997, supra note 18, at 56.
171. Gwendolyn Cartledge & Carolyn Talbert Johnson, Inclusive Classrooms for Students With
Emotional and Behavioral Disorders: Critical Variables, in 35 THEORY AND PRACTICE 51-52 (1996).
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with other disabilities. 172 The very high number of children in out-of-home
care that either have or are identified as having EBD makes them particularly
at risk for educational segregation.
2. Educational Risk Factors Shared by Children in Out-of-Home
Care
Children in foster care who are educationally at-risk are uniquely burdened
by their double status. 173 They share the disadvantages and stigma both of
children in the foster care system and of children in special education. In fact,
their disadvantages at home and school are not merely additive. Rather, the
two interact to achieve a type of multiplier effect, unfortunately worsening the
child's opportunities for better care in both spheres. Yet foster children who
are educationally at-risk also have singular needs, and, despite their incredible
diversity, share common risk factors arising from their situation beyond the
sum of those facing foster children and those facing children in special educa-
tion. These risk factors include legal status, lack of effective advocacy and
caretaker involvement, geographic instability, family trauma and a high inci-
dence of mental illness, and the negative stereotypes and lack of awareness
with regard to the situation of children in foster care. These unique needs are
often overlooked and these children left unprotected by the legal and political
paradigms which channel them into one identity and overlook their multidi-
mensional experiences. 74 Below, I outline some of these characteristics,
leading to my argument in Part III that special steps need to be taken to ade-
quately identify and provide special education services for children in out-of-
home care, without resorting to stigmatizing generalizations.
(a) Legal Status
The legal status of children in out-of-home care creates educational risk
factors, including lack of recognition of a child's foster care status by her
teacher, unreliable access to services, and delay in service provision as a result
of funding disputes. All children in out-of-home placements share, by defini-
tion, a legal status which is different than that of children not in the child wel-
fare system. This information is significant with regard to the educational
system in many ways: for accessing certain funding sources (i.e., family pres-
ervation "wraparound" services), for safety (i.e., who to call in an emergency),
and for teacher-family coordination (who comes to parent-teacher night?).
172. KAUFFMAN, supra note 150, at 70.
173. This is in addition to other stigma that they may face based upon race, gender, class, disabil-
ity, or other factors.
174. For further discussion of the inadequacies of current equality theory to address the needs of
those persons at the intersection of multiple identities, see Part II.A infra, outlining in part the pivotal
analysis of Kimberl6 Crenshaw in this regard.
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More-over, teachers often find knowing about a child's status in the child wel-
fare system very important to the successful inclusion of these children in their
classrooms. 175 Despite laws mandating child welfare agencies or the juvenile
court to disclose such information, 176 in practice it is often withheld or acci-
dentally lost in the process of enrollment. 177 Moreover, lack of fixed protocols
and uncertainty over who should take responsibility for doing so at the ground
level-the foster parent or social worker-cause further delays and gaps in a
child's school records.
Even beyond its relevance to general education, child protection status has
an especially profound impact on a child's access to special education services.
Notice to and consent of a parent or legal guardian is initially required at sev-
eral key points in meeting the educational needs of exceptional children-for
evaluation, implementation of an IEP, or a change in placement.' 78 Moreover,
children without parental advocates or surrogates may often fall through the
cracks in terms of referrals and services, following the old adage that "'when
all are nominally responsible, none is truly responsible."" 79 For instance,
teachers often have more responsibility to request a team evaluation for foster
children, since so many players are involved (foster parents, social worker,
natural parents), each with unclear rights to the child (legal versus physical
versus educational custody) that often no one acts and the child is left with
substantial needs unmet. Because the child protection and special education
systems "traditionally have run on two separate tracks," neither system is pre-
pared to take responsibility for or fully cooperate in fulfilling a child's entire
set of needs.'
80
The complex legal status of children in out-of-home care may also make it
difficult to access the appropriate special education funding mechanisms. In-
teragency disputes, particularly over funding, can stymie progress in a child's
attempt to access special education and other services. Under federal law,
states and LEAs must provide all special education services free to eligible
175. This problem of not having enough information about a child's home situation was high-
lighted by all eight teachers I spoke or worked with in California and Massachusetts.
176. California law, for instance, requires child welfare workers to inform educational authorities
when a child with a disability is placed in foster care, including the provision of relevant information
about the status of the parents' educational rights, or the movement of a child from one placement to
another. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56156(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7579.1 (West
1995). The juvenile court sometimes shares this responsibility. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7579 (West 1995).
177. This is a pressing and widespread problem. See, e.g., Foster Youth Services, SpEd Placement
Process Meeting, Concord, CA (March 4, 1998) (on file with author).
178. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(C), 1415 (West 2000).
179. Frank J. Macchiarola et al., The Judicial System & Equality in Schooling, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 567, 574 (1996) (quoting Herbert J. Walberg & Herbert J. Walberg Ii, Loving Local Control, 53
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 19, at 26 (1994). The extreme mobility of foster children also contributes
to the failure by schools to "flag them" as at-risk cases by schools. See Deborah L. Cohen, Foster
Youths Said to Get Little Help With Educational Deficits, 10 EDUC. WK., June 12, 1991, at 8 [hereinaf-
ter Cohen, June 12].
180. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at 10.
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children, including residential placements that are part of an IEP. 8 1 Yet resi-
dential placements made for other reasons, such as a juvenile court decision,
must be paid for by a child's parents or a child welfare agency.' 82 School dis-
trict and child welfare personnel also dispute the costs of, for instance, related
services such as mental health. 183 Further disputes arise between school dis-
tricts as to the child's residency and which district must pay the costs of special
education services.1 84 The wrangling over costs leaves many foster children
without full access to the educational services that they merit.
(b) Lack of Effective Advocacy and Caretaker Involvement
Many children in out-of-home care lack effective educational advocates.
Since the special education system is premised on grassroots enforcement by
parents of children's educational rights, 185 the lack of an effective advocate
can significantly frustrate the ability to receive an adequate and fair referral
and subsequent provision of special education services. Barriers in communi-
cation and complex institutional practices make it difficult for parents who are
able and willing to provide their children with safer, more stable homes to ad-
vocate effectively for their educational needs; the task can be insurmountably
formidable for parents already disadvantaged by race or class biases, or for
foster parents with little motivation to intervene or with little experience deal-
ing with their new charge and the local school district. However, the involve-
ment of the foster parent who takes care of the child in question is essential not
only to securing evaluations and services under IDEA, but also to assisting
teachers and other service providers in achieving a child's educational and de-
velopmental goals. 186 Children in out-of-home care face substantial hurdles to
caretaker involvement in this regard, which can decrease their chances of bene-
fiting from an individual educational plan. Although IDEA requires states and
LEAs to develop procedures to protect children in out-of-home care, such as
the assignment of a surrogate educational parent, 87 the lack of effective iden-
tification and monitoring of the special education needs of children in out-of-
181. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1999).
182. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 155.
183. Id. at 150.
184. E.g., Brockton Pub. Schs., 26 IDELR 238 (No. 97-2292, June 17, 1997) (ruling that Massa-
chusetts law makes the district in which the child's parents reside responsible for paying for special
education residential placement rather than the district wherein child resides with her foster parents);
Board of Educ. of Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 428, De Kalb County v. Board of Educ. of High Sch.
Dist. No. 214, Cook County, 26 IDELR 12 (No. 2-96-1112, May 16, 1997) (holding that Illinois Law
requires the school district in which a child's "natural parents" reside to pay for special education, re-
gardless of where the child and her foster parents live); see also Caitlin v. Ambach, 558:165 (N.D.N.Y.
1986). The use of school residency requirements to deny children and youth educational equality of
opportunity is discussed further infra in Part II.C.
185. See further discussion of this at infra Part II.C.
186. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 96.
187. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(b)(2), 1439(a)(5) (West 2000).
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home care demonstrates that these processes are not currently being utilized
effectively.
188
Many additional obstacles make effective educational advocacy by adults
in foster children's lives very rare. The paradigmatic advocate under IDEA, a
parent, is usually not available to fill this role for a child in out-of-home
placement. At least one state, California, requires that parental rights be sepa-
rately limited or terminated specifically with regard to a child's education-i.e.
removal from the home for abuse or neglect is not sufficient. 189 In many cases,
however, parents who retain educational rights have abandoned their children
or are incapable of effectively advocating for their children's educational needs
due to, for instance, substance abuse. 190 Moreover, those parents who do retain
their parental rights with regard to education do not often receive help and
guidance in becoming effective advocates. 191 Non-parental caretakers face
similar challenges. Although child welfare workers are required by law to pro-
vide foster parents or group homes with the health and education records of the
children in their care,' 92 they do not always do so, and foster parents or other
caregivers are left inadequately informed to properly advocate for children.
Federal, 193 and sometimes state, 194 law forbids state actors involved in a
child's education and care to serve as the educational "parent" of a ward of the
state, thereby creating a further hurdle for securing effective advocacy on be-
half of a child in the child welfare system. (Moreover, despite recent changes,
foster parents are still not automatically granted parental rights in the educa-
tional realm). 195 All agents of a public or private agency caring for or educat-
ing a child are included in this bar, such as social workers, foster agency em-
ployees, school employees, and probation officers. This rule is intended to
protect children from conflicts of interest when advocates serving as parents
are employed by the same entity as they are advocating against (i.e. the gov-
ernment). In practice, however, it often leaves children in out-of-home care
188. George et al., supra note 125.
189. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5(a) (West 1995).
190. However, a system like California's can result in beneficial cooperation between parents and
social workers where education can be the one piece of their child's life in which parents can effectively
participate.
191. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 78.
192. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16010 (Supp. 2000) (mandating the inclusion of "a health
and education summary" in the case plan of each child in the dependency system, directing the child
protection agency to give this plan to the child's caretakers within 30 days of her initial placement in
foster care, requiring the child's caretaker to maintain education and health records, and ordering the
court to direct parents appearing before it to provide the child protective agency with complete health
and education information).
193. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(2) (West 2000); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(a)(2) (1999) (stating that
the term parent as used in IDEA does not include "the State if the child is a ward of the state"). Cf. 34
C.F.R. § 300.515(c)(3) (1999) (allowing the appointment of employees of nonpublic agencies that pro-
vide noneducational care for the child as surrogate parents if they meet other criteria).
194. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7579.5(g) (West 1995).
195. Infra notes 378-391 and accompanying text.
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unprotected since many of those who would be their best advocates-such as
social workers and group home employees-are banned from assisting them.
Exceptions to this rule have been carved out in some states. 196 A few re-
cent rulings indicate that group home employees, for instance, would not
automatically be disqualified from serving as educational surrogate parents if
they met the other requirements of knowledgeability and lack of a conflict of
interest. Instead, the reviewing agency or court should look at the facts on a
case-by-case basis.197 Moreover, even if they are not serving as surrogate par-
ents, social workers, group home employees, and others may also be included
in the IEP process with the consent of a child's parent or school. Yet, these in-
roads are far from complete. California, for instance, continues to maintain an
absolute bar against employees of a public agency involved in the care or edu-
cation of the child serving as educational surrogates, regardless of the facts of a
case. 198
Finally, parents may not just be unavailable for advocacy, but may actually
thwart the process of appropriate educational referrals and services for their
children. Because of their lack of clearly empowered advocates, children in
out-of-home care are, perhaps to a greater extent than other children in need of
special education referrals, vulnerable when parents or caretakers deliberately
withhold information from school officials for fear of being blamed for their
child's educational problems. The current paradigm gives such parents, who do
not have their children's best interests in mind, tremendous power to put their
children at risk educationally and to prevent the provision of equal educational
services.
(c) Geographic Instability and School Residency Requirements
The tremendous geographic instability experienced by children in foster
care puts them at risk educationally. These children often move homes multi-
ple times per year and these moves usually require a school change as well.
Sometimes these moves result from crises and happen within a few hours.
Children may stay in temporary foster homes or emergency care shelters for
weeks or even months. Many children in this situation do not receive the
services they need from the neighborhood, shelter, or group home school
which are not willing to take on the costs of evaluations for a temporary stu-
dent, or cannot handle matters beyond the crisis of finding a home placement
or caring for the children in their custody.
199
196. Kish, 211 EHLR 182 (OSEP 1978) (allowing noneducational state or county employee to
serve as educational surrogate based upon a case-by-case analysis).
197. Letter to Thompson, 23 IDELR 890 (OSEP 1995).
198. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 7579.5(g) (West 1995).
199. The Katie I case discussed throughout this Article, for instance, focused mainly on the most
transient and at-risk sector of children in out-of-home care who are in shelter and other very temporary
care. Katie L Consent Decree, supra note 141.
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If children do stay at the same school after a move, they often have exten-
sive 'travel time' between home and school. Frequent moves can cause some
of these children to miss a great deal of school time, and this is exacerbated by
school time missed as a result of court dates, visitation, and other child protec-
tion related matters. Further, as noted previously, the inconsistency of records
transfers is notorious and often results in a child's educational profile being
lost and his or her placement in an inappropriate program. Although child wel-
fare agencies are usually required to transfer health and education records of
foster children to their new foster homes, 200 in practice this often does not oc-
cur in a reasonable time, if ever. 20 Some of these problems related to geo-
graphic instability constitute risk factors even when considered independently.
For instance, the number of schools attended and the percentage of time absent
from school are two of the variables in at least one test for at-risk children.
202
Yet, a discussion of the experience of frequent moving is not complete
without considering the emotional toll that dislocation and relocation can exact.
Moves can be very disruptive to children's relationships and development and
"undo" previous gains in their academic and social growth. The constant relo-
cations of foster children create tremendous instability both at home and
school. As one teacher says, "When a child doesn't know where he is going to
be, there's just no way he can function in a classroom." 20 3 At home, they must
adjust to new caregivers and siblings, and the atmosphere of a new household.
At school, they must constantly readjust to new friends and teachers, as well as
to different instructional methods and inconsistent or overlooked evalua-
tions.2°4 Rick Weissbourd points out that children who move frequently are
sometimes forced to rely excessively on family members, which may be un-
healthy, and potentially more damaging when the family itself is legally unsta-
ble as in foster families. 20 5 The risk-factor of geographic instability is common
to all foster children at some point, although it can vary a great deal depending
upon the stability of the child's placement and service plan, and the individ-
ual's development and resilience. Despite individual differences, however, the
"moving factor" should not be underestimated: one study found the category of
foster children to be more indicative of educational failure than the related
category of EBD, and hypothesized that geographic instability was a major
cause. 206 This instability has led one group of experts to analogize foster chil-
200. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16010(b) (West 1991) (requiring child welfare work-
ers to transfer records to foster parents upon changes in placement).
201. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 95.
202. Smucker et al., supra note 55, at 33.
203. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at 15 (quoting Elaine Murphy, a second grade teacher in
Contra Costa County, California).
204. Ayasse, supra note 131, at 207-08.
205. RICHARD WEISSBOURD, THE VULNERABLE CHILD: WHAT REALLY HURTS AMERICAN
CHILDREN AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOuT IT (1996) at 106-110.
206. Smucker et al., supra note 55, at 34.
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dren to the children of migrant farm workers. 20 7 Geographic instability can be
even more disruptive for foster children than children of migrant families,
however, because the former are moving from one parent to the next, not just
among locations.
(d) Family Trauma and Higher Prevalence of Mental Illness and Behavioral
Disorders
Children in out-of-home care, by definition, have suffered some disruption
in their family and other personal relationships. Most of the children in foster
care are there due to parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, which can have
devastating effects on a children's ability to trust and bond with adults and
even peers.208 Foster children are often separated from siblings and other rela-
tives as well as their parents, and thus lack any of the security that family rela-
tionships bring. The trauma of removal from one's home and separation from
family has a tremendous effect on a child's interaction with adults and other
children, as well as ability to focus on other issues such as schoolwork. 209 As
noted previously, the factors may cause many children in out-of-home care
who are not learning or otherwise disabled to appear to show signs of emo-
tional and behavioral disorder. The mental health stresses on children in out-
of-home care both create the possibility that they will be improperly designated
as disabled for special education services, and produce actual educational risks
for these children, which do not rise to the level of a disability, but which
should be addressed.
The pressure of deviating from the theoretical societal norm of the two-
parent nuclear family still exists for the fairly small proportion of children in
foster care who achieve lasting, even eventually adoptive, placements. One
study posits that children in divorced, single-parent households are more at risk
for special education referrals than children in nuclear two-parent families.210
Foster care placement involves substantially greater trauma and stigma than
divorce. Teachers and school administrators often worsen the isolation of chil-
dren in out-of-home care by using curricula focusing on the nuclear family211 or
structuring school-family activities around children with biological mothers
and fathers. The fact that children in out-of-home care are reacting to family
pressures that testers and teachers may not know about or acknowledge can
greatly increase the potential for the over identification of these children for
207. George et al., supra note 125, at 421.
208. Ayasse, supra note 131, at 207.
209. Id.
210. John R. Beattie & Gregory 0. Maniscalco, Special Education and Divorce: Is There a Link?,
I TECHNIQUES: A J. FOR REMEDIAL EDUC. & COUNSELING (1985).
211. Jim Mahsuz, Director of the Family Center, talked of one foster child who was traumatized
by an assignment requiring children to draw their family trees, "beginning with their parents." Inter-
view with Jim Mahsuz, Director of Family Center, in Somerville, Mass. (April 1997).
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special education.
As well as being more likely to be diagnosed with behavioral disorders
than children not in foster care, children in out-of-home care are also far more
likely than other children to have mental health needs. The prevalence of
mental illness is much higher among children who are dependents of the state
than among children with similarly deprived backgrounds who remain in pa-
212rental or informal family care. Not surprisingly, abuse or neglect and re-
moval to the child welfare system thus prove to have their own unique and
damaging effects on a child apart from other risk factors such as socioeco-
nomic status. Even children in foster care without EBD or mental health diag-
noses appear to have more problems following the mainstream classroom rou-
tine and interacting well with their teachers and peers. Teachers describe
substantially more foster children than other children-up to nine times as
many-as having problems with attention, self-image, and depression.213 At-
tention deficit problems are another concern, with children in foster care
seeming more prone to easy distractions while doing work in-class or at home.
Some of these diagnoses or depictions may be due to the bias of educators
and other professionals, but the vastly increased prevalence of emotional and
behavioral disorders and other emotional needs among foster children make
them characteristics worth considering, both to identify and prevent problems
before unnecessary referrals are made, and to check this bias by ensuring that
diagnoses are made based upon careful evaluation and criteria applicable to
214that individual child 1. Some of the emotional and behavioral problems that
foster children show may be part of a fairly predictable developmental cycle
which occurs following removal from the home. 215 As such, it may not be
cause for removal from the classroom at all, but rather a signal for the teacher
to help the child through this difficult time with appropriate support and refer-
rals.
(e) Negative Stereotypes and Lack of Awareness About Foster Children
Foster children are often the victims of harmful negative stereotyping.
Demeaning children's abilities based on their home situation or blaming them
for family problems is unfortunately far too frequent, and the prejudices and
ignorance of others is an important shared characteristic among foster children.
This stereotyping becomes particularly important in the educational context,
212. Mel Schneiderman et al., Mental Health Services for Children in Out-of-Home Care, 77
CHILD WELFARE 29, 30 (1998).
213. Smucker et al., supra note 55, at 35.
214. An analogous theory lies at the heart of the successful and renowned Comer model-that
poor, minority children must be evaluated and then taught from their baseline of social skills and devel-
opment which may be different from the white, middleclass mainstream. See James P. Comer, Edu-
cating Poor Minority Children, 259 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN at 42-48 (1988).
215. Cormier, supra note 7, at 34-35.
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where teachers' subjective impressions can have great weight in determining a
child's school placement and their expectations can greatly impact a child's
potential to achieve. 216 As one foster parent advocate puts it, "The reality is
that teachers expect foster-care kids to be trouble."
217
Some teachers have negative biases against children in foster care, espe-
cially those with EBD, and harbor misconceptions about their development and
qualities as a group.218 One study recorded teachers making comments such as
"[floster children cannot learn because they were prenatally exposed to illegal
drugs," "[a]ll foster children will lie, steal and will kill," and "[a]ll foster chil-
dren have done something wrong or bad and that's why they are in foster
placement. ' 219 When children in out-of-home care "act out" their emotions in
reaction to the trauma they have suffered, teachers may see the behavior as
"bad or uncooperative," rather than as natural and often remediable through
care and attention rather than special academic services. 220 Teachers and
school personnel may single out and stigmatize children in out-of-home care-
whether consciously or unconsciously. Tales range from using a loudspeaker
to direct children in out-of-home care to a van designated only for "foster
kids," to giving them different colored lunch tickets.221
Much of this prejudice and insensitivity arises out of a lack of knowledge
about the experiences and development of children in out-of-home care. Edu-
cators often isolate foster children because they do not understand them or
think that they are incapable of changing. A teacher at one Washington D.C.
elementary school explained that she suspended and dismissed foster children
from class while giving other children a "second chance" because she was not
going to "waste" her time with these "fools." Her frustration at not knowing
how to handle these students turned into antipathy at the children them-
selves. 222 Many educators are overwhelmed by the new and diverse needs of
their students and are not trained or provided enough time to competently
identify and deal with at-risk foster children.
216. Regarding the latter proposition, that teacher expectations can be very influential in deter-
mining student success or failure, see Macchiarola et al., supra note 179, at 577-78.
217. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179 (quoting Gordon Evans, information director for the National
Foster Parents Association of Houston). All of the approximately twenty social services personnel and
teachers contacted for this project described the negative stereotyping of foster children in schools as
widespread and very harmful.
218. Sawyer & Dubowitz, supra note 130, at 596.
219. Cormier, supra note 7, at 21-23, 57-58.
220. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at 9 (quoting Eileen Mayers Pastor, Director of Family Fos-
ter Care for the Child Welfare League of America).
221. Id.
222. Cormier, supra note 7, at 17.
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II. EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL
Children in out-of-home care with special educational needs embody what
Martha Minow has termed the 'dilemma of difference' in its starkest form-
how can the law give every child the safety and support he or she needs to
thrive at home and in school without stigmatizing him or her?223 For instance,
identifying a child as disabled under IDEA entitles him or her to individualized
educational assistance, thus potentially enabling the child to better achieve
success and integration in society, but it simultaneously labels him or her as
handicapped and subjects him or her to the stigmatization and isolation that
that label often brings. 224 The debate over difference takes place against a
backdrop of tremendously scarce resources. Labels of special needs can bring
the bearer rights and funding, making difference a source of power. Yet even
the identification of process rights based upon membership in a category may
not ensure equality of result in a significant fashion.
This Part addresses various equality theories and their relationship to the
situation of children in out-of-home care with special educational needs. First,
I consider equal protection law and the work of critical theorists discussing
equality related to other disadvantaged societal groups, such as women, people
with disabilities, and people of color. This leads to several important insights
about the constructed nature of otherness and the inability of current equal
protection law to protect people falling into multiple or overlapping categories.
Next, I outline the conceptions of similarity and difference underlying the child
welfare and special education systems. Both systems focus on after-the-fact
intervention rather than prevention, and function through individual labeling
rather than universal service provision. Nonetheless, inclusion in a mainstream
environment to the maximum extent possible is a guiding equality principle in
education. Children are granted few, if any, rights but rather are presumed to
be served by the merger of their rights with those of their legal parents. This
reliance on parental advocacy is, however, at great odds with the structure and
assumptions underlying the child welfare system. Child protection is built
upon a framework of foster families whose legal rights with regard to their
foster child are weak, if not nonexistent. Finally, this discussion will then in-
form an analysis of some equality principles that could be used to address the
unique situation of children in out-of-home care who face educational chal-
lenges.
223. See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) [hereinafter MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE].
224. Id. at 36.
Vol. 19:81, 2000
Exceptional Children in Out-of-Home Care
A. Equal Protection and Difference
The existing rights-based model of equal protection emphasizes the bipo-
larity of sameness and difference, 225 treating those deemed similarily situated
the same and those deemed dissimilar differently. Based upon a liberal ethos
of individual self-determination, current doctrine also fails to recognize the
complex and mutually impacting relationships between people and societal in-
stitutions in shaping and constraining identity. This model has been criticized
for classifying individuals on the basis of normalcy and difference rather than
recognizing relationships and social constructions of categories, 226 neglecting
to recognize the complex and unique oppression of individuals with
intersectional and multifaceted identities, and overly relying on formalism,
thereby failing to address substantive inequalities.227 Although this paper does
not argue that more enlightened treatment of exceptional children in out-of-
home care can be compelled on the basis of constitutional equal protection ar-
gument, 228 the critique of equality models outlined below is informative in as-
sessing the unique discrimination against these children with regard to their
statutory rights to special education. This critique is then incorporated into
strategies and suggestions for change that have the potential to achieve broader
and more substantive equality of opportunity for these children.
1. The Social Construction of "Otherness"
Certain human characteristics previously thought of as intrinsic and "im-
mutable" biological attributes, such as race, gender, and disability, have been
shown to be at least partially constructed by unstated norms, prejudices, and
relationships governed by societal rules.229 The current legal paradigm posits
these categories of characteristics as natural, inevitable divisions between what
is normal and what is "other ' 230 without recognizing the social construction of
225. Id. at 146-47.
226. See id; see also Glennon, Race, Education, supra note 121, at 1290-1313.
227. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 124 at 386. See also ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 153
(1997).
228. Disability is neither a suspect or semi-suspect category under the Constitution, and thus mer-
its only rational review. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding that
disability is not a suspect classification and thus does not merit heightened equal protection scrutiny).
Family status in terms of illegitimacy has earned intermediate scrutiny as a semi-suspect category. See
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
229. See, e.g., Thomas Armstrong, ADD as a Social Invention, EDUC. WK., Oct. 18, 1995, at 40;
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in
the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Ian Haney L6pez, The Social Construc-
tion of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1994) (discussing the social construction of race); Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and
the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435 (1986).
230. An early elaboration of this concept can be found in Simone de Beauvoir's seminal work,
THE SECOND SEX (Knopf 1993) (1953). For an informative discussion of the construction of racial mi-
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such categories and their inherent relationship to political power and oppres-
sion. In so doing, the law both explicitly231 and implicitly defines people's
identities in a manner which either bestows rights and privileges or confers
disadvantages and stigma.232 For instance, the children discussed herein are
defined as "other" by virtue of their legal status as children in out-of-home care
merely because they are not in the "normal" social construction of home care.
With this designation as "other" come both stigmatization and barriers. The
law thereby simultaneously ignores and helps to create the individual and sys-
temic biases against persons deemed different by turning a blind eye to the so-
cial forces that shape some categories while treating these categories as funda-
mental and immutable and investing them with great legal import.
This exclusionary principle of difference pervades our society-from legal
rules and decisions to communal institutions, including the classroom. 3 And
the labeling and segregation that often accompany a designation as different
can be devastating to the self-image of persons deemed different. They often
internalize the fear, anger and disgust visited upon them by others 234 and can
engage in self-destructive or anti-social behavior as a result.235 This reaction
can be particularly pronounced when it occurs across multiple socially-
constructed categories, such as disability and race.236 For instance, Theresa
Glannon has demonstrated how the social constructions of race and disability
have interacted with systemic and individual biases of schools and educators to
effectively resegregate children of color into separate special education
classes.2 37
This difference paradigm posits difference in the individual, thereby stig-
matizing him or her. Thus, as Martha Minow has argued, the law categorizes
and draws lines between "normal" and "abnormal," rather than recognizing dif-
ferences as socially relative and equally valuable. Difference is deemed de-viant by comparison to a normalcy posited as superior and natural.239 The in-
norities as "others" through American law, see Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the
Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995).
231. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (designating race based upon percentage of
blood for purposes of perpetuating racial segregation). See also M.T. v. J.T, 355 A.2d 204 (1976) (dis-
cussing the construction of gender in upholding a marriage between a man and a post-operative trans-
sexual).
232. See generally MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS & THE LAW
59-84 (1997) [hereinafter MiNow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF].
233. See generally PALEY, supra note 1.
234. See IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987).
235. See Charles H. Post, The Link Between Learning Disabilities and Juvenile Delinquency:
Cause, Effect and 'Present Solutions,'32 Juv.& FAM. CT. J., Feb./Mar. 1981, at 58, 60-61.
236. See Minow, Bilingual and Special Education, supra note 104, at n. 147 (quoting Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)).
237. See generally Glennon, Race, Education supra note 121.
238. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 223.
239. Minow, Bilingual and Special Education, supra note 104, at 203.
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dividual rights approach thereby reinforces existing power structures. 2 40 An
alternative social relations approach would recognize the mutual relationship
among people, in other words a child in foster care is different from a child
living with his parents just as a child living with his parents is different from a
child in foster care. Each needs the other to define himself.
24 1
The first step toward a social relationship approach is recognizing the ex-
tent to which difference is socially-constructed and changes depending upon
the context. To demonstrate this point, Martha Minow cites the widespread
use of sign language by both hearing and deaf persons on Martha's Vineyard in
the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries because of high hereditary levels of
deafness. 242 Definitions of race and sex have changed over time. 243 Our con-
ception of disability has proven to be particularly flexible, being simultane-
ously limited with technological advances and expanded with a recognition of
"new" disabilities, 244 such as cosmetic disfigurements and drug and alcohol
addiction.
There are several advantages to revealing the socially and legally-
constructed nature of various categories. For one, the burden of difference can
be lifted from the individual and placed onto the social and legal institutions
that stigmatize and classify. Second, group membership can increasingly be
seen as a choice rather than an inherent, potentially disabling condition. This
not only avoids the inherent privacy invasion and oppression in assigning
group membership, but may also be empowering or politically mobilizing.
245
This philosophy underlies the increasingly widespread self-definition by deaf
individuals that "being deaf is a culture and a source of pride, 246 rather than
being a disability. Finally, a revelation of the artificial and discriminatory con-
struction of categories allows individuals to demonstrate their experiences of
treatment at the hands of others, and concomitantly unite around social re-
form. 2 4 7 Recognizing the causal contribution of others' perspective on, and
treatment of, certain groups has led to advances in anti-discrimination law such
as the protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act for individuals who
are regarded as being limited in the performance of one or more life activities
due to a physical or mental impairment, even if they are not in actuality im-
240. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 223, at 108-09.
241. Minow, Bilingual and Special Education, supra note 104, at 203-04.
242. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 223, at 85 (discussing Nora Groce's
book Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language).
243. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 231, supra.
244. Some disabilities are new phenomena, but most are simply a refraining of issues previously
(and often still) thought of as moral failures into public health problems.
245. WEST, supra note 227, at 11-12.
246. Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, §6 at 40.
247. Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil Rights, in
IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES, supra note 234, at 14-15 (discussing these underlying
rationales for the use of a social disability model in the American disability movement).
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paired.248 This expansion of equality protection results from congressional
recognition of the social construction of disability, in part "resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of [indi-
viduals with disabilities] to participate in, and contribute to, society." 249
The law's failure to recognize the social construction of "othemess" is par-
ticularly significant for children in out-of-home care who are at-risk education-
ally because much of their identity is explicitly legally constructed (being in
the child welfare system) and is then stigmatized. Special education labels are
also applied to children whose behavior does not fit the norm, although not
constituting a disability in any medically determinable sense.250 This is par-
ticularly true of the categories under special education which have more am-
biguous boundaries, such as emotional/behavioral disorder (EBD). Using the
treatment of disability as a model, it might be possible to force recognition of
the social construction and stigmatization of the "difference" ascribed to chil-
dren in out-of-home care. Disability, like being placed in the child welfare
system, is a functional concept, and thus is a relative rather than intrinsic char-
acteristic. 251 Disability can be analogized in some ways to a child's legal fam-
ily status, although legal family status is even more flexible than disability. As
family definitions change both over the long term in society, and within a
child's life, for instance through adoption, someone's status as a foster child
will also change, potentially becoming less stigmatizing. Recognizing the so-
cial construction and stigmatization of difference with regard to children in
out-of-home care can not only help exceptional children in out-of-home care
mobilize around a group identity for change, but can also help us all move to-
ward systemic change.
2. The Failure To Recognize Intersectional Identities
The legal categorization of people narrowly into one group for equal pro-
tection analysis ignores the complex reality of individual identities made up of
many overlapping group memberships. The use of bounded, protected identity
categories in the rights model "obscures claims that cannot be understood as
resulting from discrete sources of discrimination., 252 The rights model fails to
identify and alleviate the unique oppression of, for instance, women of color,
253
and disabled women. 254 Moreover, dominant anti-discrimination doctrine fo-
248. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(c), Americans with Disabilities Act (West 2000).
249. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
250. Glennon, Race, Education, supra note 121, at 1291.
251. Id. at 1304.
252. Crenshaw, supra note 124, at 383.
253. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 124.
254. See, e.g., Anita Silvers, Reprising Women's Disability: Feminist Identity Strategy and Dis-
ability Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 81 (1998); Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of
Disability, 4 HYPATIA 104 (1989).
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cuses only on the most privileged members of any group, thereby ignoring the
multiple and unique sufferings of the most subordinated people.
255
This exclusion of intersectional individuals is perpetuated not only by the
structure of the legal system, but also by the politics of movements advocating
for social change for one or the other identity. Both Kimberl6 Crenshaw and
Angela Harris critique the feminist movement for failing to incorporate the ex-
periences and needs of black women. 6 This essentialism in feminism
"[leaches woman] of all color and irrelevant social circumstance, [bracketing]
issues of race as belonging to a separate and distinct discourse," thus positing
woman as white and white women's problems as inclusive of the problems of
all women.257 Yet, any social movement needs some basis of commonality to
function effectively. Thus, Harris calls for the recognition of a multiplicitous
self, acknowledgement that differences are relational, and a community built




Children in out-of-home care with special education needs are also at the
intersection of two classifications.259 Both the legal structure and advocates
within the system often ignore the dual nature of these children's identities,
thereby obscuring their unique and multi-faceted needs. By presuming an in-
tact parent-child relationship, IDEA and special education personnel overlook
children who have been removed from parental care. By focusing solely on a
child's home situation, and assuming that this is distinct from her educational
needs, child protection legislation and advocacy also neglect the interests of
these intersectional children.
The special education and child protection systems need to be expanded to
accommodate the multi-faceted identities of the many children involved in
both. Coalitions between these two systems and their advocates must be built,
as they will not inevitably emerge. 260 Attempts at coalition-building can be in-
formed in this regard by the disability rights movement. Like child welfare
status or educational risk, disability differs from race, sex, or national origin in
often failing to be an individual's primary group identification. 26  This is in
large part attributable to the fact that identification as disabled, like identifica-
255. Crenshaw, supra note 124, at 383-87.
256. Crenshaw, supra note 124, at 383 (also discussing the failure of anti-racist politics to incorpo-
rate the experiences and needs of black women). See also Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
257. Harris, supra note 256, at 592.
258. Id. at 608.
259. For an elaboration of this point, see supra Part I.C. This is not to suggest that exceptional
children in out-of-home care are in the same situation as, say, African-American women, because the
former are in a category - children in out-of-home care - that does not receive heightened scrutiny for
equal protection analysis, unlike the latter which receives heightened scrutiny on two axes (race and
gender).
260. See Harris, supra note 256, at 612-15.
261. See Silvers, supra note 254.
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tion as a foster child, may occur later in life. As a result, the disability move-
ment has had to consciously focus on common ground, particularly by focusing
on their societal stigmatization, while simultaneously allowing for a diversity
of other identities and lifestyles. 262 This same balance between the cohesion
necessary for political change with the individuality essential to full inclusion
is a prerequisite to the coordination of the child protection and special educa-
tion systems.
3. The Ignorance of Substantive Equality and the Perpetuation of the
Dilemma of Difference
The current equal protection model is, finally, severely limited by its fail-
ure to account for equality of outcome. The rights model has been widely
criticized for its failure to recognize substantive inequities in society and for its
focus instead on formalism, process, and the illegitimate use of protected cate-
gories as decision-making factors.263 The dominant anti-discrimination theory
assumes that if race and sex are not illegitimately used in decisions, a neutral,
and thus fair, outcome will result. Procedural protections, however, not only
fail to improve substantive equality, but may themselves be applied un-
evenly.264 In special education, for example, the focus on procedural compli-
ance and deference to educational agency decision makers has resulted in a low
standard of substantive compliance and reluctant and weak judicial over-
sight. 2
65
Formal equality requires individuals to be identified as different in order to
receive different treatment, since it takes as its premise that like should be
treated alike. This tense partnership between labels and rights in the dominant
legal paradigm presents a "Hobson's choice" to advocates.266 Children's ad-
vocates, for instance, need to label their clients in order to obtain funding and
procedural protections, but in so doing risk oversimplifying or stigmatizing
children and forcing them and their families into categories that don't fit. As
one school social worker framed it: "The system forces us to catastrophize
things, to stigmatize and label [children] in order to get funding and serv-
ices.' 267 In both child protection and special education, advocates are faced
262. Id.
263. See Crenshaw, supra note 124 at 386. The need for a more nuanced equal protection system
encompassing a "spectrum of standards" was articulated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion to
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973).
264. See Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: The
Evolution of Children's Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1557, 1560-61 (1995).
265. William H. Clune & Mark H. Van Pelt, A Political Method of Evaluating the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, in CHILDREN WITH
SPECIAL NEEDS 9, 54-64 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1987).
266. Glennon & Schwartz, supra note 264, at 1565.
267. Interview with Dee Dee Costello, a social worker at the Tobin School in Roxbury, MA (Mar.,
1997).
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with a procedural dilemma of difference in deciding whether to encourage the
identification of all children with special needs so they receive vitally needed
services, or to avoid identification in order to escape stigmatization and re-
strictive placements.
Beyond whether or not to label, service providers must determine which
label to use. The benefits and detriments children receive vary enormously de-
pending upon the system under which they are first labeled.268 There are also
substantial risks in mislabeling a child, such as overly restrictive placements
and segregation. IDEA recognizes these risks, especially when labeling is
based upon biases against or ignorance about children of color.269 Although
labeling can be reduced, it is "an inevitable part of the discourse" under the
current individual entitlement framework of special education. 27 At least one
study found that attempting to ban the labeling of students simply resulted in
unofficial and "covert" labeling, as well as a lack of effective monitoring of
service provision. 271 Thus, the pattern of excessive formalism and proce-
durally-driven treatment continues.
The dilemma of difference and the focus on procedure as opposed to out-
come is particularly vexing for children in out-of-home care who are educa-
tionally at risk. According children in out-of-home care the same procedural
protections as other children, such as parental consent and involvement, is
meaningless when they often have no stable adult equivalent to a parent272 to
advocate for them. The focus on process in the special education system has
obscured the disparity in substantive equality of opportunity for exceptional
children in out-of-home care. Yet, a shift to focusing on outcome instead of
procedure prompts the question, "[d]oes equality mean treating everyone the
same, even if this similar treatment affects people differently?, 273 Only label-
ing can bring these children the services they need to approach equality of out-
come of other children, yet stigma and exclusion may accompany the services.
Martha Minow suggests transcending this unsolvable choice between stigma
and appropriate treatment by questioning the very definition of difference.
Once difference ceases to be relational to some "norm" and sited in the indi-
vidual, we can begin to move beyond the negative labels and segregation to
address the institutional structures and group settings that can best meet each
268. Glennon & Schwartz, supra note 264, at 1565-66.
269. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1409(j)(1)(B)(i) (West 2000).
270. See generally, James M. Kauffman & Patricia L. Pullen, Eight Myths About Special Educa-
tion, 28 Focus ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 1, 12 (Jan. 1996).
271. Id.
272. Here I am including both children in out-of-home care without stable adult advocates in their
lives due to multiple placements or other unstable adult relationships, or children in out-of-home care
whose adult caretakers such as foster parents are not empowered or included in IDEA parental advocacy
system.
273. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 223, at 9.
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274child's different needs. This may create new categories in place of the old,
such as foster care, but these categories may be used to help children by
changing the entire setting to accommodate them rather than removing the
child as a piece that doesn't fit. We need to move beyond a formalistic focus
on neutrally operating rules to look at the entire system itself and how it works
to further subordinate already marginalized groups.
B. Legal Construction of the "Normal" Family and Child Powerlessness
The law recognizes only certain relationships among people as "family"
connections. By according certain groups family status, the legal structure cre-
ates the "normal" family and treats other groupings as deviant and unworthy of
protection. The conceptualization of the "normal" family does not reflect the
historical or current reality of American relationships and households. More-
over, it does not recognize functional families, such as foster families, and thus
leaves a gap in adequate caregiving for children. The paradigm of the "nor-
mal" family combines with children's lack of independent standing and indi-
vidual rights to deprive children in out-of-home care of a stable home place-
ment and adults empowered to advocate for them. Because the special
education system does not encompass children without a stable home and pa-
rental advocates, the law's construction of the family and denial of children's
rights contributes to the educational inequalities of children in the child welfare
system.
1. Paradigm of the "Normal" Family and Preeminent Parental Rights
Defining "family" is very difficult,275 and depends upon the situation of
the actors - children, parents, state agencies - involved. The law has limited
its conception of family to those in biological relationships 276 and those fol-
lowing "official rules of family formation," such as adoption and marriage.
277
The latter will outweigh the former when traditional societal institutions appear
to be threatened. For instance, the Supreme Court has accorded parental rights
to a husband and denied them to the biological and, in part, psychological fa-
ther in the name of the sanctity of traditional legal relationships such as mar-
riage.278 Limited case law2 79 and statutory authority28° incorporate a func-
274. Id. at 79-97.
275. 1 FAMILY MATTERS: READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW (Martha Minow ed., 1993)
[hereinafter FAMILY MATTERS].
276. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a local ordinance re-
stricting land use to single-family dwellings and defining family as either one or more blood relatives or
no more than two unrelated persons living together in a single housekeeping unit).
277. FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 275, at 19.
278. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
279. One line of cases, for instance, requires "unwed fathers" to take some action beyond mere
biological parenting to merit full due process before losing custodial rights. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robinson,
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tional definition of family. However, for the most part the law posits the "nu-
clear family," consisting of two heterosexual parents with children, as the norm
against which other groupings are measured and thereby fails to recognize (and
even stigmatizes) other relationships. 281 Although the Supreme Court recog-
nized family rights beyond the nuclear family in Moore v East Cleveland
282
when it struck down a zoning ordinance limiting residential occupancy to
single families defined to exclude a grandmother from living with her two
grandchildren, 283 Moore is arguably treated as an aberration rather than a
widely recognized and functioning family kin situation.284 Subsequent case
law has narrowly construed the rights of extended family members to raise
their children.285 This limited legal definition of the family is particularly
inapplicable to children in non-parental care, since the rights of their actual
caretakers or "psychological parents" are rarely, if ever, recognized.286
Ironically, the legally-recognized family has very little to do with the reali-
ties of most American households and communities. Many people live with
other adults whom they are not married to, whether in heterosexual or gay and
lesbian partnerships. Many children are cared for by single parents, other rela-
tives, or people to whom they are not biologically connected. "Kinship" com-
munities of relatives and friends function like families287 without the legal im-
primatur. 28 The diverse reality of households and relationships in our society
reveals the legally-recognized family to be a fiction-albeit one that underlies
the statutory schemes governing foster care and special education, and carries
with it very significant rights and powers.
Family-based rights are framed in terms of parental (biological or adoptive)
463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). This line of reasoning has not yet
been applied to mothers, presumably because their biological parenting role is deemed to be more sub-
stantial and their identity is easier to ascertain, thereby precluding delays in child protection proceedings
to establish maternity.
280. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, for instance, defines sons or daughters to include
adoptive, biological, foster and step-children, and legal wards, as well as children for whom the em-
ployee serves in loco parentis. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(12) (West 1999).
281. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (finding unconstitutional a court's grant
of visitation rights to a child's paternal grandparents as violative of mother's due process rights). For a
fuller discussion of this subject, see Martha A. Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family
in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387 (1993).
282. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
283. But see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (refusing to recognize close relatives as a sus-
pect of quasi-suspect class for Equal Protection purposes).
284. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered
Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649 (1995).
285. See, e.g., Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 79 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to recognize a liberty in-
terest in a grandmother to adopt her grandchild).
286. See discussion of foster family cases infra at Part II.C.
287. Carol Stack, Personal Kindreds, in FAMILY MATTERS 23 (stating that "the folk system of pa-
rental rights and duties determines who is eligible to be a member of the personal kinship network of a
newborn child").
288. See Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes: The Need for a New
Funding Scheme for Kinship Caregivers, 22 FORDHAM URB. J. L. 907 (1995).
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liberty and privacy in the selection of lifestyles for themselves and their chil-
dren.289 Deemed "far more precious than property rights ... more significant
and priceless than liberties that demure merely from shifting economic ar-
rangements," 290 parental rights are particularly strong when related to deci-
sion-making power about a child's education. 291 Parental and family integrity
interests have even been held to outweigh those of a child in certain child wel-
fare proceedings. 292 Finally, parental rights are primarily constructed as "all or
nothing"-there is little separation of various responsibilities to and rights over
children. 293 The current legal structure's inability to allow various family
rights to vest in different individuals does not fit the reality of many children's
lives, wherein several different adults, who may or may not be their parents,
play important caretaking and emotional roles. This is particularly true for
children in out-of-home care who may have biological parents, social workers,
foster parents, judges, and non-parental relatives all trying to make decisions
for their welfare.
2. Children's Lack of Independent Rights to Their Family
Relationships
Children's status as legal minors denies them the full rights of adults. They
do not have standing to bring legal actions on their own behalf, including ac-
tions relating to who should have custody or parental authority over them. In-
stead, they must access the legal system through a guardian ad litem, or "next
friend." '294 Children's lack of independent standing is based on legal discern-
ment of a coincidence between parents' and children's interests and a pre-
sumption that parents will serve the best interests of their children most effec-
tively.295 This legal structure protects individual families against state
intrusion, and, theoretically, allows a diversity of different lifestyles, religions,
289. See, e.g.,Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a law requiring Amish
families to educate their children in state-approved public or private high schools); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (asserting parents' right to choose non-public education for their children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding parents' right to choose foreign language instruc-
tion for their children).
290. Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Blackmun, J. dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
291. It is no coincidence that all three 'parental rights' cases cited supra in note 289 are education
cases.
292. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 n.l 1, 765-66 (1982) (finding parents' substantive rights to
be more threatened by termination proceedings than children's family integrity rights); see also De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (stating that if state child
protection actors had "moved too soon" to remove child from parental custody despite past and foresee-
able future abuse, they would have risked violating father's parental rights).
293. One exception to this principle is the retention of independent educational rights under Cali-
fornia law by parents found to have abused or neglected their children.
294. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding in part that
a minor does not have standing to bring a termination of parental rights suit against his natural parents).
295. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760, 765.
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and cultures to thrive. Many children will be protected and advocated for un-
der this system. Children in foster care, however, will likely not be, since pa-
rental incapacity to care for them is a prerequisite to their placement. Unfortu-
nately, the law continues to presume a merger of parental and children's
interests when determining parental fitness, even after a child is removed from
the home.
2 96
Children do not, further, have a substantive due process right to protection
from parental abuse while in parental custody, even after extensive documen-
tation of abuse by a child protection agency and foreseeable risks for continued
abuse upon a return to parental care.297 While the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the state's duty to "assume some responsibility for [the] safety and gen-
eral well-being" of persons in state custody, potentially including children and
youth in out-of-home care,298 and some circuit courts have found that children
involuntarily placed in foster care have a constitutional right to reasonably safe
living conditions,2 99 the state may only intervene in its parens patriae role.
300
The parens patriae duty is relatively limited and has not been interpreted as
putting the child in the best possible situation of family care.30 1 Instead, the
state may only intervene after a finding of parental failure to adequately care
for a child is made. 302 Throughout the child protection process, parents' sub-
stantive due process rights are protected by a series of procedural rights303 and
the requirement that child protection agencies make reasonable efforts to re-
unite families. 3°4 Some commentators have argued that the minimal standards
296. Id.
297. DeShaney,489 U.S. 189.
298. Id. at 199. The Court in DeShaney declined to hold on state responsibilities to children in
foster care as the issue was not directly presented in the case. Id. at n.9. However, other Supreme Court
rulings support a constitutional right to freedom from harm and basic necessities on the part of children
in out-of-home care. E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
299. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987).
300. The common law doctrine ofparenspatriae (literally "parent of the country") posits the state
as the guardian of all persons "under legal disability" such as minors and the insane. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
301. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
302. Most courts follow the "jurisdictional-dispositional standard" in child protection cases, which
consists of a two-step process imposing a threshold finding of parental unfitness before any considera-
tion of the children's interests. ALAN SUSSMAN & MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS
100 (1980). The court does not balance the interests of the parents and the children, rather it pits the
parent against the state in a contest not unlike a criminal trial. After findings of parental unfitness and
"reasonable efforts" by the state agency, the court holds a dispositional hearing to determine what action
the "best interests of the child" suggest. Some state systems do not ever address the best interests of the
child and instead terminate parental rights on the basis of a parental rights standard alone. In the latter
case, a finding of parental unfimess is the only relevant factor.
303. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a law presuming un-
wed fathers unfit parents without an individual hearing). For an outline of procedural protections for
parents in child abuse and neglect cases, see Peter J. McGovern, Child Neglect and the Termination of
Parental Rights: A Final Remedy in Need of Reconsideration, 8 AM. J. FAM. L. 215 (1994).
304. See Part I.A supra for a discussion of the changes to this requirement under the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997.
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of care required of parents are too low,30 5 while others see these protections as
essential or even insufficient to protect parents' rights, especially parents al-
ready disadvantaged by race or poverty.
306
The desire to balance the protection of children with enforcement of pa-
rental rights has led to the previously discussed dual purpose of permanency
planning (including termination of parental rights and adoption) and family
preservation which underlies child welfare legislation. These goals often ap-
pear irreconcilable 307 and attempts to balance them have in practice led to a
largely crisis-driven rather than preventive approach to child protection which
helps neither families nor children. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 represents a major shift in child protection policy by emphasizing perma-
nency planning over family preservation, although both are still required. The
new legislation may improve the potential for equality in education for foster
children due to its focus on permanency and steps toward empowering foster
families. 308 However, children in out-of-home care currently are often denied
the same access to home and parental advocacy as other children due to their
lack of standing and limited independent substantive rights, and the breakdown
in the parent-child relationship that results in their placement in foster care.
3. Restrictions on Foster Families from Adequately Replacing or
Supplementing Biological Families
In stark contrast to biological and adoptive families, foster families have
historically been accorded few if any rights.30 9 This stems from the potential
clash with traditional (i.e. biological or adoptive) parental rights310 and the cur-
rent legal structure's refusal to split up the bundle of family rights. Thus, the
statutory structure and child welfare process conceive of foster parents as tem-
porary caregivers for children on the way to permanent care with biological or
305. E.g., Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 63, 67 (1995) (quoting Bar-
bara Bennett Woodhouse in arguing that the scope of permissible action give parents virtual property
rights over their children, despite the disavowal of the common law notion of children as chattels).
306. Douglas J. Besharov, How Child Abuse Programs Hurt Poor Children: The Misuse of Foster
Care, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 218 (1988); see also Roe v Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769 (D. Ala.
1976) (finding a violation of parental due process where a child protection agency removes a child from
the home without threat of imminent harm but rather because the custodial parent is living with an un-
married man of another race); see also Nanette Schorr, Foster Care and the Politics of Compassion in
117 FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 275.
307. See FAMILY MATTERS, supra note 275, at 187 (outlining one point of view which finds a
child protection socialworker "faces an inevitable and insuperable conflict between offering genuine
assistance to the family and serving as an investigator obliged to report violations and empowered to
trigger the removal of the child from the parents' home").
308. See supra Part L.A for a fuller discussion of these aspects of the new legislation.
309. See Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
310. Id. at 846 (stating that tension between rights of biological and foster parents is "virtually un-
avoidable"); see also Kristin J. Brandon, The Liberty Interests of Foster Parents and the Future of Fos-
ter Care, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 403, 423-26 (1994).
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adoptive parents, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 31 Foster
families have historically been preferred to institutional care for children be-
cause they resemble the "natural" family, yet they are constantly being distin-
guished from the legal family and even kin because they are paid, licensed, and
directed by the state.312 Foster parents have often been denied any claims to
custody of a child in their care, and have even been berated by judges when
they wanted to adopt children in their care for "conduct[ing] themselves in a
fashion inconsistent with their agreement and, indeed, diametrically opposed to
their trust."
313
The Supreme Court, in Smith v. OFFER, conducted a searching analysis of
the status and role of foster families and recognized that "a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may
exist even in the absence of blood relationship," thus distinguishing foster
families from "a mere collection of unrelated individuals" unworthy of any
protection. 314 However, the Court left open the question of whether a foster
family has a liberty interest requiring the same procedural or substantive due
process protections as biological and adoptive families. 315 Instead, it found
certain minimal procedures to suffice as due process protection for the foster
family prior to removal of a foster child.316 Despite declining to outline the
scope, if any, of foster families' rights, the Court distinguished them from
"natural" families by the foster family's origin from state contracts, rather than
history, tradition, and "intrinsic human rights" like the "natural" family.317
The Court reasoned that the state statutes and contracts outlining foster care as
a temporary measure argued against investing a liberty interest in the foster fam-
ily in the case at hand,3 8 but it did not rule out the possibility that such a lib-
erty interest could be found to exist under a different set of circumstances.
319
Finally, the Court expressed the general concern that the child welfare system
may be biased against biological parents who are low-income and racial mi-
311. See supra notes 17-22 (discussing number and condition of children in foster care).
312. Smith, 431 U.S. at 863. Consider also the use of payee status to determine the scope of foster
parent abilities to serve as surrogate educational parents. See Letter to Thompson, 23 IDELR at 890
(stating that whether the foster parent's compensation for care-giving constitutes his or her sole source
of income is a factor for consideration in determining foster parent's eligibility to serve as educational
surrogate parent).
313. In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 1959).
314. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844-45 (distinguishing foster families from a group of unrelated individu-
als such as that at issue in Village of Belle Terre).
315. Id. at 842-47.
316. Id. at 847.
317. Id. at 845. Of course, the "natural" family is often created through state institutions such as
marriage and adoption. See also David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifi-
cations for Permanency Planning for Children, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 215, 227 (1995) (arguing that
the foster family's control by the state does not allow it to fulfill one of the family's political roles of
"producing socially diverse citizens as a control on majority factions").
318. Smith, 431 U.S. at 845-46.
319. Id.
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norities, and favor foster parents who are often "higher-status.
320
Lower federal and state courts321 have differed in their resolution of the
foster family liberty interest question left open in Smith v. OFFER. Several
circuits have found that foster families do not have a liberty interest because of
their temporary and state-created nature.322 The Fifth Circuit, for instance, rea-
soned that the concept of foster parenting and the vesting of parental rights are
utterly contradictory-"the only time potential parents could assert a liberty
interest as psychological parents would be when they had developed precisely
the relationship that state law warns against [in] the foster context.' 323 The
Seventh Circuit recently endorsed this reasoning and found that promises by
the state child welfare agency to foster parents that foster parenting would im-
prove their chances of adopting and that a child in their care was "97% adop-
table" did not change the foster parents' lack of liberty interest in their foster
family. 324 These rulings place foster families in a conundrum-they agree to
and ideally do provide a child with a safe, stable, maybe even pre-adoptive
home, but are contractually bound not to develop an attachment or resist giving
up the child at the state's command.
There is some indication, however, that a recognition of parental rights in
foster parents is developing. Several district courts have found a limited liberty
interest in the foster family relationship, thereby moving closer to a functional
family definition. 325 The cases seem to turn on the facts specific to each case,
including the existence of deep ties between the foster parents and the child
(including blood ties in one case of kinship care),326 and the absence of bio-
logical parents willing or able to care for the child.327 The district courts fo-
cused on the emotional ties that may develop in foster families, one court rea-
soning that "[i]t is artificial to treat a relationship that time and events have
transformed into the most profound relationship known to mankind-mother
320. Id. at 834, 838.
321. E.g., Johnson v. Burnett, 538 N.E. 2d 892 (II1. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that foster parents
have no liberty interest in the foster family relationship under Illinois law).
322. E.g., Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1993); Backlund v. Barnhardt, 778 F.2d
1386, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1985); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't. of Family & Children's Serv., 563
F.2d 1200, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1977).
323. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1208. It is interesting to note that the opposite treatment is some-
times accorded biological mothers under surrogate parenting contracts, i.e. it is understood that they are
not able to give up children who they birth even if they take no caretaking role. In both foster parent
and surrogate parent situations, the emotional bonds are presumed to come from biological birth rather
than caretaking.
324. Procopio, 994 F.2d at 327-29.
325. E.g., Rodrigues v. McLoughlin, 1999 WL 9834, No. 96 Civ. 1986 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1999)
(recognizing "a liberty interest in only a discretely identifiable set of foster parents"); Brown v. County
of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653.(E. D. Cal. 1985); Rivera v. Marcus, 533 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn.
1982).
326. Rivera, 533 F. Supp. at 207.
327. In Brown, the parental fights had been terminated, and in Rivera, the biological mother
wanted the foster mother to care for her children.
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and child-as the purely legal relationship that it originally was." 328 This court
also recognized a "hierarchy of rights" in families in place of the traditional all-
or-nothing system.329 Thus, foster families may have a liberty interest in their
relationships after the rights of the biological parents are terminated.33 °
Under the legal construction of 'family' and the presumed merger of pa-
rental and children's rights outlined above, denying foster families or parents a
liberty interest in practice also means weakening the rights of children in out-
of-home care because no adults are adequately empowered to care for them.
Moreover, a lack of protection for foster family relationships means that chil-
dren lack permanency because moving them around is not just possible, but
easy. Children do not have the right to an optimal placement in state cus-
tody. 33 1 They also do not have foster families who are fully empowered or
authorized to adequately care for them.332 Yet, to achieve equality within the
current framework of parental rights, as embodied in IDEA for instance, chil-
dren in out-of-home care need someone empowered legally to advocate for
them in lieu of their biological parents.
Thus, the existing legal conception of "family" confronts children in out-
of-home care with a double bind: they are protected only by family rights
vested in their biological parents, yet these parents have failed to care for them,
and neither the children themselves nor their foster parents and other caregivers
are empowered to fulfill this role. Denial of a recognized and empowered fam-
ily potentially robs children of many things such as the development of proper
associational skills,333 a sense of family or belonging, and advocacy for edu-
cational services. This results in the under- and overrepresentation of children
in out-of-home care in special education-their needs are either ignored or
misunderstood so as to prompt overly restrictive placement.
Nonetheless, the dual track in the Adoption and Safe Families Act, child
protection trends such as "fostadoption," and the willingness to recognize a
limited liberty interest in foster families are all potential sources of increased
legal recognition and empowerment of foster families. Encouragingly, foster
parents are increasingly being permitted to fulfill expanded roles for children in
328. Brown, 601 F. Supp. at 664.
329. Id. at 664.
330. Id.
331. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1992). This can be seen as analo-
gous to the Supreme Court's decision that a special education placement need not maximize a child's
educational placement, but rather may be "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educa-
tional benefits." Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
332. It is important to note that granting foster parents the same "rights" in a child as biological
parents can lead to the reinforcement of the current non-child-centered system and potential for abuses
of power and action not in the best interests of the child, and perhaps the entire legal structure needs to
change to better accommodate children's voices and needs. This view was expressed by at least one
participant in Smith v. OFFER. See David L. Chambers & Michael S. Wald, Smith v. OFFER, in IN THE
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN 67 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
333. Herring, supra note 317, at 238-39.
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their care, sometimes even including that of educational surrogate parent prior
to the termination of biological parental rights.334 These efforts toward provid-
ing children in out-of-home care with substitute parental figures empowered to
care for and advocate on behalf of them are a good first step to achieving in-
creased educational equality for foster children.
C. Educational Access and Inclusion for Children in Out-of-Home Care
Providing all children with the same access to education through integra-
tion is a very significant equal rights principle 335 and is embodied in the special
education context in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) requirement of
IDEA 336 and the inclusion movement. Yet achievement of this principle is of-
ten frustrated with regard to children in out-of-home care as a result of the dif-
fering philosophies and methods of implementation of the child protection and
special education systems. As noted previously, the child protection system is
limited by a construction of family which does not include foster families.
Thus, children do not have sufficient standing or empowered advocates to de-
mand due process or equal treatment in special education since enforcement
under IDEA is largely premised on parental advocacy. 337 Further, lack of an
effective advocate under IDEA is especially problematic because the special
education system is premised on labeling. Where a child is without an effec-
tive advocate or independent rights, he is at the mercy of a system which can
mistakenly assign him a label and thereby stigmatize and segregate him.
338
These conflicting principles governing equality in education again raise the "di-
lemma of difference" conundrum: how can we accommodate different
strengths and needs without stigma?
339
1. Access and Inclusion as the Route to Educational Equality
(a) Equal Access to Education
The battle for educational equality for children of all races is one of the
most celebrated legal stories of our time.340 In the landmark case Brown v.
Board of Education, the Supreme Court asserted that separate education is "in-
334. See discussion of this trend supra Part I.C.
335. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
336. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(5)(B) (West 2000).
337. Nothing in this Article is meant to question the effectiveness of parental advocacy as a means
of enforcement and grassroots communal involvement in education for many children. Rather, I am
looking to expand this effective method to include all children.
338. This is the whole premise underlying special education, i.e., that services are only available to
children who have been tested and found eligible due to disability.
339. See generally MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 223.
340. For a compelling and thorough account of Brown, 347 U.S. 483 and the history of African-
Americans' struggle for equality in America, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
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herently unequal,",341 ending, at least in theory, centuries of race-based school
segregation. The Brown Court recognized the importance of education for fu-
ture success in employment and full civic participation, calling it "perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments." 342 The Court based
its holding largely on the devastating effects of segregation on individual chil-
dren, which "generate[s] a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect [their] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 343 The principle of equal access to education articulated in Brown
has since been extended to children previously excluded by discrimination
based on gender 344 and disability.
345
However, the wide scope of the right to equal access in education sug-
gested in Brown has subsequently been considered in different contexts and, in
some cases, narrowed. The Court has found that children and youth have in-
terests in education and its benefits important enough to require some due pro-
cess before it can be taken away even for a short time in the form of a tempo-
rary suspension. 3 46 Despite its recognition in Brown that educational
opportunity "is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms,"
347
however, the Supreme Court later "retreat[ed] from [its] historic commit-
ment" 348 by holding that education is not a fundamental right349 when it ruled
that a school-financing system based on local property taxation was constitu-
tional under rational equal protection review.350 Thus, the Court condoned
vastly different levels of educational services to children residing in different
school districts without regard to the severe inequities in equality of outcome
that resulted.
The Court's declination to protect equality of outcome has allowed for the
continued existence of policies that result in significant inequality of outcome.
Access barriers to educational equality continue to exist, for example, in the
form of residency requirements. 35' Such requirements often have the effect of
denying children who are homeless and in out-of-home care access to public
341. 347 U.S. at 495.
342. Id. at 493.
343. Id. at 494.
344. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding the Virginia Military Institute's ex-
clusion of women to be unconstitutional).
345. See PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
346. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (guaranteeing public school students some due pro-
cess before a suspension based on their property interest in education and liberty interest in reputation).
347. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493
348. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349. Most state constitutions, however, confer a fundamental right to education upon their citizens.
Butt v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668 (1992); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971).
350. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 & 59(1973).
351. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but may be found in Glen
Renner & Julia J. Hyun, Public School Residency Requirements for Students Living on Their Own or
With Non-Parent, Non-Guardian Caretakers, Center for Law and Education (1993).
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education. 352 Funding disputes among school districts and child welfare agen-
cies 353 and difficulties in obtaining requisite proof of residence 354 can delay
school enrollment for children in foster care. While school districts can be re-
quired to enroll children even pending funding disputes (the Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights has stated that refusal to enroll a child in
foster care with special education needs pending reimbursement of costs by
another educational agency violates the IDEA regulations 355), such disputes
continue to delay enrollment. Further, beyond funding disputes, a lack of in-
formation or advocacy on the part of a child's caretakers is sometimes ex-
ploited by schools to deny children access. For instance, children in a majority
of states are now permitted to enroll in the public school of the district in which
they actually reside even if their parent or legal guardian does not live in the
district, as long as the residence is not solely for the purpose of entering a cer-
tain school district.356 However, school officials may persist in telling foster
parents or social workers that there is no space for a child in their school even
though this is not a permissible ground for exclusion if the child is a resident of
the district.
357
There are few restraints on how residency requirements can be applied.
Residency requirements are generally constitutional on their face 358 and, al-
though they may be found to violate either the due process or equal protection
clauses if overly limiting 359 or if applied in a discriminatory fashion,360 school
districts that exclude a child because of a residency dispute are not always re-
quired to provide a due process hearing to determine domicile.36' Further,
there are no IDEA provisions that specifically address residency requirements.
While IDEA regulations do require a child to be placed as close to home as
possible and be educated in her neighborhood school unless this is inconsistent
362
with her IEP, courts have largely construed this mandate to require only in-
352. For a discussion of this problem in school districts from California to New Jersey, see Maria
Foscarinis & Lydia Ely, Broken Lives: Denial of Education to Homeless Youth, 9 CHILDREN'S LEGAL
RTs. J. 2, 2-3 (1988).
353. See cases discussed supra Part I.C.
354. This problem was extensively discussed at the Special Education Placement Process Meeting
among Foster Youth Services, Social Services and school personnel, Mt. Diablo, Calif. (March 4, 1998)
(Minutes on-file).
355. Bensalem Township (PA) Sch. Dist., 16 EHLR 893 (OCR 1990).
356. Renner & Hyun, supra note 351, at 2-7 & 11-19 (discussing case law and state statutes).
357. Again, this is a problem that has repeatedly come up in clinical work and in the experiences
of those participating in the Foster Youth Services meetings. This bullying behavior on the part of
school officials is also a common occurrence for homeless families trying to enroll their children. See
Foscarinis & Ely, supra note 352, at 4.
358. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
359. See, e.g., Horton v. Marshall Pub. Sch., 769 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1985).
360. Byrd v. Livingston Indep. Sch. Dist., 674 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
361. See, e.g., Horton v. Marshall Pub. Sch., 769 F.2d at 1334. But see Harrison v. Sobol, 705 F.
Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
362. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(b)(3), (c) (1999).
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clusion in mainstream education to the maximum extent possible in non-
neighborhood schools and have allowed school districts to centralize certain
special education programs. 363 Nonetheless, this regulatory mandate may still
be used to require some stability of placement for children in out-of-home care,
as outlined further below in Part III.C.
(b) Least Restrictive Environment Requirement of IDEA
The commitment to integration espoused in Brown v. Board of Education is
reflected in the "least restrictive environment" (LRE) requirement regarding
special education placement. IDEA mandates that:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other re-
moval of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs
only when the nature or severity of the disability... is such that education in regu-
lar classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved sat-
isfactorily.
36 4
Educators must balance the goal of securing services "appropriate" to an
individual child's needs with the goal of placing a child in the most mainstream
setting possible. This mandate was reinforced in the IDEA Amendments of
1997, which require that every individualized education program (IEP) contain
"an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate
with nondisabled children in the regular class" 365 and a statement of program
changes or supports that will assist the child to be educated with nondisabled
children.366 IDEA regulations also require that an LEA not provide just a bi-
polar choice of general or special education placement, but rather offer a con-
tinuum of placements and services characterized by varying levels of restric-
tion.367 The LRE requirement is also motivated and informed by a recognition
of the detrimental affects of labeling and segregation on children's self-esteem,
social skills, and educational achievement. Congress explicitly acknowledged
the harm of labeling and further emphasized these integration principles in its
recent amendments to IDEA.36
8
Circuit Courts have developed substantially different tests to determine
whether the LRE requirement has been met. Several circuits posit placement
in the regular classroom with supplemental aids as the requisite first step, with
consideration of a separate placement allowable only if that is not possible.
369
363. See, e.g., Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 1996); Schuldt
v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 77, 937 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1991).
364. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (West 2000).
365. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2000).
366. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii) (West 2000).
367. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1999).
368. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(5)(F) (West 2000).
369. Daniel R.R. v.. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989) (proposing a two-part test
asking whether education in the regular classroom can be achieved satisfactorily with supplemental
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Some circuits expressly promote inclusion even where it is not academically
superior to a special education placement because of the non-academic benefits
of inclusion. 370 Still other circuits have emphasized that strictly equal consid-
eration is due to the two parts of the special education placement equation-
appropriate education and mainstreaming. 371 Yet, it is important to remember
that all of the circuits proceed under the Supreme Court's characterization of
the "free appropriate public education" as a minimum of access rather than a
maximization of potential and educational results. 372
The split among the circuits about the level of inclusion required under
IDEA reflects the larger debate among educators and advocates about the bene-
fits and detriments of different levels of mainstreaming. 373 Inclusion has
proven to improve academic outcomes for many disabled students,374 while
segregation into special education programs can set up children with disabili-
ties for failure. For instance, youth with emotionallbehavior disorders (EBD)
(including a large number of children in out-of-home care), who are generally
placed in more restrictive settings than children with other disabilities,375 are
frequently denied access to a general academic curriculum although their dis-
ability is behavioral and does not implicate their ability to learn such a cur-
riculum. Academic weaknesses resulting from exclusion are then used to jus-
tify further exclusion.
376
Another benefit of inclusion which is of particular significance for children
in out-of-home care (who are frequently also members of other stigmatized
groups, such as children with EBD and children of color), is that inclusion is
believed to benefit the social competence of both mainstream and disabled stu-
dents through integration.377 Inclusion both diminishes the resegregation of
services and if not, whether the school has mainstreamed satisfactorily), adopted in the Third and Elev-
enth Circuits. See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist.,
950 F.2d 688 (11 th Cir. 1991).
370. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994).
371. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 691-93 (2d Cir. 1989).
372. Bd. ofEduc v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982).
373. The LRE requirement, and integration principles in special education, can be approached
from two different perspectives-mainstreaming or inclusion. Mainstreaming programs place children
with disabilities for part of the day in a general education classroom and part in a special education set-
ting. Inclusion, alternatively, aims to change the whole educational setting, by focusing more on the in-
corporation of support services into the regular classroom for children with disabilities. See Jennifer
Houston Wilkinson, Student Article, The Movement for Inclusion: Teaching Acceptance Along With
Alphabets, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 291, 296. In this discussion, I will use the terms 'inclusion' or
"inclusionary education" to refer to both methods, or any "attempt to educate the child, to the maximum
extent appropriate, in the school and classroom with the child's age-mates. See Cartledge & Johnson,
supra note 171, at 51.
374. Macchiarola et al., supra note 179, at 579-80 (citing multiple studies).
375. See supra Part I.C.
376. Eileen L. Ordover, Inclusion of Students with Disabilities Who Are Labelled "Disruptive":
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children of color into special education due to biased tests and testers 378 and
reduces the stigma associated with special education. Inclusion is largely
premised on the recognition of the stigma of segregation and its particularly
devastating effect on children's "hearts and minds" as first voiced in Brown v.
Board of Education.379 Children who are treated as stupid, or singled out be-
cause they are deficient, will begin to think of themselves in that way. Al-
though there is some evidence that inclusion may cut both ways in terms of
stigma-it decreases stigma by mainstreaming students with their peers, but
may increase stigma as students are forced to reveal their difference in the
classroom with peers who are not disabled380 -schools can take steps to
minimize stigma in integrated classes and, thereby, allow all children to benefit
from the extra resources in terms of staff and educational tools that inclusion
can bring. The New Haggerty School in Watertown, Massachusetts, for in-
stance, brings all service providers, such as speech and physical therapists and
reading tutors, into its integrated classrooms. These experts usually work with
all the children, and focus on children with special needs during "choice time"
during which children choose from a variety of different activities.
38 1
On the other hand, inclusion does have some weaknesses as a form of edu-
cation, both for children with special needs and children without such needs.
382
Firstly, inclusion may be used to justify denying exceptional children services
that they are entitled to under IDEA. Educators argue that inclusion is appro-
priate for some children, but may be used to deny an appropriate placement
(FAPE) to children who need more specialized services.383 Related to this ar-
gument is a critique of the assumption that separation is inherently stigmatiz-
ing, and that exceptional students cannot gain a positive self-identity from
sharing their experiences and achievements with other exceptional children.
384
Consider, for example, the analogous situation where separate education for
traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women and African-American boys
is advocated because it is believed to instill pride in and knowledge about a
378. See generally Glannon, Race and Education, supra note 121. Of course, inclusion alone will
not solve this serious problem, which requires instead a re-evaluation of the supposedly "objective"
means used to test and track children, as well as education to check biases among educators.
379. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
380. Supporting this point, one study found that special education students preferred to receive
pull-out rather than in-class services in part because it is less embarrassing. The same students, however,
preferred to receive help from their classroom teacher rather than a specialist to avoid being singled out
for their skill deficits. Joseph R. Jenkins & Amy Heinen, Students' Preferences for Service Delivery:
Pull-Out, In-Class, or Integrated Models, 55 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 516, 518-22 (1989).
381. Author's visit to New Haggerty School in April, 1997.
382. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion," 72
WASH. L. REv. 775 (1997); Anne M. Hocutt, Effectiveness of Special Education: Is Placement the
Critical Factor? in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 79-102.
383. See generally Kauffman & Pullen, supra note 270.
384. Id. at 7; see also Dupre, supra note 382, at 818-21.
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group identity that cannot be gained from a mainstream curriculum. 385 The
failure of efforts at desegregation to succeed practically in achieving desegre-
gation or in minimizing hostilities against racial minorities has resulted in a
critical look at the supposed benefits of integration.
386
Inclusion is also criticized as having detrimental effects on the overall
school environment and education of students not eligible for special educa-
tion.387 This argument is particularly applied to students with emotional and
behavioral disorders since they may be very disruptive in the classroom. 388
Moreover, critics of inclusion frequently cite the vast differential in public edu-
cation spending per child on children with IEPs and those in regular educa-
tion.389 Courts have allowed consideration of the disruptive effects or mo-
nopolization of a teacher's time by a special education student to be considered
in assessing a child's placement, but only following examination of whether
appropriate support services in the regular classroom would ameliorate the
problem.
390
The debate over inclusion is complex and will likely continue into the near
future. However, it also seems likely that, at least with regard to children in
out-of-home care, the debate will resolve in favor of inclusion. Inclusion can
be particularly valuable for exceptional children in out-of-home care because
of their doubly marginalized status. The advantages that inclusion can bring in
terms of increasing a child's social competence and improving his or her self-
image are magnified for children in out-of-home care due to the frequent lack
of consistent adult role models at home. Children in out-of-home care (analo-
gously in some ways to children of color) are also more likely to be placed in
special education and in the most restrictive settings within special education
due to teacher bias. 391 Strong enforcement of the LRE environment is par-
ticularly necessary in these cases to counteract this bias. Finally, inclusion of
children in foster care can benefit other students and teachers by exposing them
to a diversity of families and groupings, thereby breaking down the rigid, tra-
ditional notion of family.
385. See, e.g., Michael John Weber, Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for
African-American Males, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1993).
386. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegretation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
387. Dupre, supra note 382, at 842-57.
388. See supra Part I.C for a fuller discussion of the lack of inclusion of children with EBD.
389. Dupre, supra note 382, at 777-78 (citing one city's report of annual spending of $25,000 an-
nually per special education student versus $5,611 annually per general education student)
390. See, e.g., Greer v. Rome, 950 F.2d at 697.
391. Supra discussion in Part I.C.
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2. Parental Advocacy Basis for Access and Inclusion Rights in
Special Education
Another major road block to equality in education for exceptional children
in out-of-home care is created by a combination of the factors already dis-
cussed - parental enforcement of IDEA and adherence to a traditional and lim-
ited conception of family. IDEA expressly aims to involve both parents and
educators in improving educational opportunities for children with disabili-
ties.392 As noted previously, the special education system relies on the grant of
procedural rights to parents of exceptional children for the enforcement of
these children's substantive rights to educational equality. One group of ex-
perts summarizes: "A fundamental premise of federal and state special educa-
tion law is that each child's parent will be an active participant throughout the
special education decision-making process." 393 Parental consent is required at
multiple stages in the process, and a lack of parental consent can excuse an
LEA's failure to provide services to a child with a disability. 394 The latter is
particularly disturbing considering the frequent lack of possible parental con-
sent for children in out-of-home care. Further, parents continue to have rights
under IDEA even when the disabled child has reached the age of majority, as
long as he or she is still eligible for public schooling. Federal courts have
found that an educational agency violated IDEA by not continuing to inform a
parent of all special education proceedings and allowing her full participa-
tion.395
IDEA's empowerment of parents on an individual basis is arguably a posi-
tive step toward broader equality and community involvement. 396 Yet this
system is modeled on an intact middle class family wherein a child is cared for
by one or more "legal" parents who are willing and able to use their procedural
rights under IDEA to obtain better services for her. Parental power is thereby
limited to the most informed parents with the most resources at their dis-
posal.397 This power structure is not coincidental since the primary move for
reform and the creation of IDEA's predecessor came from middle-class white
parent groups.3 98 Support for the notion that the final form of IDEA was
heavily influenced by those who lobbied for it is provided by a comparison of
392. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d)(3) (West 2000).
393. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 135.
394. Davenport (IA) Community Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 1398 (OCR 1993).
395. See, e.g., Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990).
396. Parents may still, however, be cast in the role of "outsiders or complainers" by the adversarial
procedural processes. See Minow, Bilingual & Special Education, supra note 104, at 416-17.
397. Kotler, supra note 111, at 341. Parents are disadvantaged by the IEP process because of the
inherent inequity in power in parent-professional relationships and the structure and attendance pattern
at IEPs. See Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 265, at 34-36. This is particularly true of parents of color,
parents who are poor, or parents who have lower levels of education.
398. Kotler, supra note 111, at 362.
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IDEA with other statutory methods for enforcing educational rights. The pa-
rental rights framework of IDEA, and concomitant grassroots enforcement re-
sponsibility, is very different, for example, than the bilingual education frame-
work implemented under Title V of the Civil Rights Act of 1964399 Bilingual
education is usually approached and resolved at a "classroom or school-wide"
level as opposed to the more individualized approach of IDEA.40 IDEA is not
the only possible framework for implementing and enforcing educational
rights, and thus may "constitute a major reallocation of power to parents in the
assignment of educational resources and placements."
40 1
As previously outlined, the parental enforcement system of IDEA does not
function when parents' interests have been deemed divergent from those of
their children, even harmful to them, as is the case with children in out-of-
home care. The lack of parental advocacy has a particularly detrimental effect
because other monitoring and compliance mechanisms by courts and govern-
ment agencies are secondary and "after the fact" in reliance on parental advo-
402
cacy.
In summary, the frameworks of the child protection and special education
systems, set within current equal protection doctrine, interact to deny children
in out-of-home care adequate equality in terms of education. The child protec-
tion system is limited by a natural conception of the family which does not in-
clude foster families. Children do not have independent rights to safety, fam-
ily, and special educational due process, and instead must rely on their legal
parents to secure these protections for them. The gap in equal opportunity is
particularly acute in special education because IDEA relies on parents to en-
force the identification and appropriate placement of children with disabilities.
The impact of these systemic contradictions on exceptional children in foster
care is heightened by the rights-based equal protection model's failure to con-
sider the social construction of difference, intersectional identities, and sub-
stantive equality.
III. TOWARD EMPOWERMENT AND EQUALITY FOR ALL CHILDREN IN SCHOOL
AND AT HOME
Any solution to address the unique problems of exceptional children in out-
of-home care requires action on a broad number of fronts. Social workers,
teachers and school administrators, foster parents, and child advocates must all
take steps to close the current gaps between the child welfare and special edu-
cation systems, and ensure that all children are placed in the least restrictive
399. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1994). My thanks to Professor Rachel Moran at Boalt Hall
School of Law for pointing this out.
400. Id. atn.172.
401. Minow, Bilingual and Special Education, supra note 104, at 397-98.
402. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 265, at 33.
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environment possible with access to all of the services that they need. This
Part outlines actions that different persons in a child's life can take and pro-
poses changes to the current legal rules governing the intersection between
child welfare and special education to accomplish real equality.
A. Focus on Children's Needs, Listen to Their Voices, and Empower Them
An initial step toward addressing the educational needs of exceptional chil-
dren in out-of-home care is listening to and empowering them. To this end,
advocates should be trained to listen to these children and to work with them,
rather than just for them. Moreover, children should be given increased
standing to assert their rights under IDEA, as well as be included to the maxi-
mum extent possible in their IEP development and implementation.
1. Advocates Can Learn from Intersectional Children
Uncovering and articulating the experiences of underrepresented persons is
one step toward the achievement of greater equality through a transformation
403of our legal and social systems. As Angela Harris puts it: "In order to ener-
gize legal theory, we need to subvert it with narratives and stories, accounts of
the particular, the different, and the hitherto silenced., 40 4 The current special
education system is premised on the abstract notion of parental enforcement
and, thereby, excludes children in out-of-home care by failing to consider the
actual plight of children without parental advocates. The startling high preva-
lence of educational risk among children in state custody requires more study
to determine its scope and causation. Listening to the "voices" of children in
out-of-home care regarding their educational needs is a pivotal first step.
A "child-centered approach" aims to incorporate children's experiences
and needs into the law and "tame the adult 'rights talk"' in order to better rec-
ognize and meet children's interests. 4°5 An honest assessment of the realities
of all children's lives rather than reliance on abstract principles is necessary to
achieve a child-centered approach and the "paradigm shift '40 6 that will be re-
quired for the special education and child welfare systems to adequately meet
the needs of intersectional children. For educational providers, this means
learning about the legal and social consequences of abuse, neglect and out-of-
home placement, as well as the impact foster care or abuse and neglect can
403. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BFIFALO L. REv. 1, 4 (1990).
404. Harris, supra note 256, at 615.
405. Holmes, supra note 284, at 1671-72 (discussing the child-centered analysis of Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse and laying out his own child-centered adoption policy.)
406. This term is taken from Theresa Glennon's argument for a new approach by educators to
children with S.E.D., an analysis analagous to the one attempted herein. See Theresa Glennon, Dis-
abling Ambiguities Confronting Barriers to the Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60
TENN. L. REv. 295, 320-21 (1993).
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407have on a child's behavior and performance in school. 4  Social workers and
child protection workers, conversely, must be more aware of the educational
challenges facing the children that they deal with who are in the child welfare
system and infuse this knowledge into the process of choosing and monitoring
children's home placements.
The child protection and special education systems must also empower
children and youth in addition to focusing on and listening to them.
Empowerment of exceptional children in out-of-home care, who often lack pa-
rental or other advocates who fully understand both their educational and home
life needs, is the only way effectively to ensure children's equality.4° To this
end, children should have greater standing in procedures-legal, administra-
tive, and otherwise-that are at least designed to act in their interests or which
significantly impact their lives.409 Currently, at least one state grants children
and youth standing to request a special education due process hearing, but only
if they are emancipated or are dependents of the court for whom no parent can
be located and no appropriate surrogate parent can be appointed.410 Although
this covers the most vulnerable children, and is a very significant start, there
are many children and youth in out-of-home care who would not fall within
this definition but whose educational rights are not being adequately enforced
by their parents, foster parents, or surrogate parents. All children and youth, to
the extent possible given age and capacity, should be given the power to en-
force their own educational rights.
2. Children Should Be Included to the Maximum Extent Possible in
IEP Development and Execution
Children and youth should be included in IEP meetings whenever possible,
taking into account age and disability. 41 The current special education system
does not mandate inclusion of a child in the meetings determining his or her
assessment, placement, and services. Instead, it requires the agency to "invite
the student[s]" aged fourteen and older, and those younger "if appropriate," but
does not include any procedural safeguards to ensure or facilitate the atten-
dance of students, as. it does with parents.412 In practice, this system allows
407. For further discussion of teacher training on this issue, see infra Part III.E.
408. See generally Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the
Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1585 (1995).
409. Standing in legal and administrative proceedings might require the appointment of counsel,
which children often already have, even in the absence of standing, in dependency cases. In many
cases, a lawyer would not be necessary-other kinds of advocates would suffice. Because parents are
already included in the IEPs to represent a child, there would be no extra burden to increase inclusion of
the child herself, With or without an advocate, it would be more empowering than the current situation.
410. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56501(a) (West 1989 and Supp. 2000).
411. 1 would argue for a very low threshold here, as very young children and persons with severe
disabilities can often express their preferences if properly informed and encouraged to do so.
412. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(b)(2) (1998).
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parents and educational personnel to choose whether a child will be included or
not. 4 13 Children should be guaranteed a voice in these meetings so pivotal to
their futures unless the LEA can demonstrate a compelling reason why this is
not possible. Like a parent under the current law,4 14 children would not be
appointed counsel, but would have the right to bring an advocate.415 A child's
IEP team should then give weight to a child's preferences in implementing the
program. Finally, individual teachers should ask children about their preferred
method of service delivery, a step too often ignored which may have surprising
results.4 16
3. Children and Youth Can Be Empowered To Advocate and Work
Together
Empowerment can also include encouraging children to join together in
advocating for common ends. 417 Just as children and youth are excluded from
proceedings that determine their individual placements, they are usually not
permitted or enabled to voice their interests or to advocate for their goals on a
broader scale. One very successful counter-example is the California Youth
Connection (CYC), an organization of current and former foster youth who ad-
vocate for state and federal legislation affecting children in out-of-home
placement, educate the public and policy makers about the needs and realities
of foster youth, and provide resources for foster children transitioning out of
care into independent living as adults. Children and youth could be empow-
ered in a similar manner to create similar advocacy networks to deal with spe-
cial education issues. This would unify children with disabilities and educa-
tional needs and allow non-foster youth to better understand foster youth.
Youth in foster care with educational needs could work with organizations
such as CYC to link foster youth in general education to their peers in special
education. Finding commonality with other youth and advocating on issues
relevant to all can help resolve the intersectionality problem.
Children and youth can also advocate for themselves by enforcing laws
413. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii) (West 2000) (defining individualized education program
(IEP) team to include "the child with a disability" only "whenever appropriate"). Unfortunately, during
my clinical experience at Legal Services for Children in San Francisco, I had calls from several youth
about parents and school officials who abused this gap in IDEA by excluding older children very com-
petent to attend simply so they could make decisions regarding placement that the child would object to.
414. Id. § 1415(h)(1).
415. This would differ from child welfare court hearings where federal law mandates that children
be appointed a guardian ad litem, although this is often not an attorney. See ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE
CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND
PROTECTION CASES 3 (1993).
416. See supra note 380 for discussion of the study by Joseph R. Jenkins & Amy Heinen on stu-
dents' preferred methods for special education services.
417. This participation in civic activism lies at the heart of the ideal of American democracy. See
ALEXANDER DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1988).
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through private attorney general actions, if they are granted standing to do so.
Recently proposed California state legislation would have given children cur-
rently or formerly living in out-of-home care standing to bring cases for the
suspension or revocation of a foster or group home's license and/or a civil pen-
alty because of abuse or neglect.418 Similar jurisidiction-granting legislation
could allow disabled children 419 to "police" the provision of special education
services at a grassroots level.
Finally, advocacy not only builds coalitions and achieves constructive
change, but it can also have a beneficial effect on individuals. The self-
confidence and sense of belonging gained from advocacy can help exceptional
children in out-of-home care overcome the stigma of difference that the world
forces upon them.
B. Value and Empower All Families as Educational Advocates for Children
Relationships with family members or other caregivers are perhaps even
more significant for children than for adults, as 'home' is often the only world
that children know. Moreover, adult household members are often the only
people permitted to or capable of accessing services for children and youth.
Thus, the limitation of legally recognized family interests and powers can be
devastating to children whose only relationships are not protected or even ac-
knowledged by the law. To treat each child equally, legal doctrine and statu-
tory authority must be rid of its "cultural myopia ' 420 and predicate rights on
the substance of a relationship rather than its coherence with a formal standard.
Such a functional421 definition of "family" would invest rights in adults
who act as parents for a foster child, but who are not that child's biological or
adoptive parents. Courts could follow the reasoning outlined in cases such as
Brown v. County of San Joaquin 422 to look at the facts of individual cases and
weigh a child's needs for permanency and length and intensity of his or her at-
tachment to foster parents against the potential for family preservation and ef-
forts at reunification made by biological parents. Time has shown that foster
families are often more stable and loving homes for children and youth than
"natural" biological and adoptive families. Thus, the distinction made in Smith
v. OFFER between foster and natural families, and the focus on parental rights
over children's interests in protection and attachment, are no longer valid. This
418. A.B. 1809, 1997-98 Reg Sess. (Cal. 1998).
419. As with A.B. 1809, children may be represented by an adult, but the vesting of the right in the
child ensures that there will be no potential conflict of interest such as those discussed throughout this
Article.
420. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
421. This distinguishes foster families from non-parental relatives who have not been caretakers
(i.e. functional parents), or have been found to have no interests in their relationships with a child in
cases such as Mullins v. State of Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 331 (9th Cir. 1995).
422. 601 F. Supp. 653 (E. D. Cal. 1985), discussed supra notes 325, 327.
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is especially true in light of the Congressional intent to focus on child safety
and permanency planning above family preservation evidenced in the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997.
The current definitions and valuation of different relationships needs to
change for all children to have equal access to a safe and meaningful family.
The legal framework must expand to encompass and recognize the complex
family systems-composed of people related by blood, adoption, kin,423 mar-
424riage, foster care, and more-which exist in our society today. Laws gov-
erning family composition and support need to be flexible enough to support
all families to care for children safely and to advocate for them effectively.
Such a recognition of due process rights in family relationships beyond the
model nuclear family would not represent an extension of constitutional rights
beyond those supported by tradition and history, but rather an extension of the
principles recognized in Moore v. City of Cleveland of the importance of fa-
milial relationships in our society's history.
Expanding legal protection of more relationships requires a relaxation of
the all-or-nothing parental rights system and adoption of a continuum that rec-
ognizes the multifaceted network of relations between a child and a variety of
adults.425 The reality of families today-resulting from changing demograph-
ics in terms of divorce, remarriage, stepfamilies, caretaking of children by ex-
panded kin networks and foster families, and the emerging myriad of possible
relationships through new reproductive technologies-posit rights and duties in
many different adults. Such a continuum, or hierarchy, of parental rights has
been explicitly acknowledged in cases according foster families some liberty
interests, and underlies emerging child protection and family law policies, such
as subsidized guardianship and open adoption. Once our conception of family
is expanded, all families can better be included and empowered to participate
in the education of their children.
1. Local Educational Agencies Should Ensure that Functional
Parents Are Empowered To Advocate for All Exceptional Children
State and local educational agencies have a responsibility under IDEA to
appoint surrogate parents for exceptional children in out-of-home care. 4 26Stricter monitoring and enforcement of this provision by children's advocates
423. 1 use this in the Carol Stack sense of networks of extended relatives and non-relative commu-
nity members. See Stack, supra note 287.
424. For related arguments regarding a change in the legal paradigms to accommodate different
family types, see Holmes, supra note 284 (calling for a child-centered adoption policy that incorporates
the child-friendly extended family system historically predominating in African and African-American
communities), and Mandelbaum, supra note 288 (proposing new foster care funding schemes which
incorporate the situation and needs of kinship caregivers).
425. See discussion infra Part II.B. But see Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
426. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(2) (West 2000). For further discussion of this issue, see also supra
Part I.C.
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ter monitoring and enforcement of this provision by children's advocates and
government agencies, such as the Office of Civil Rights division of the De-
partment of Education, is essential to the effective provision of special educa-
tion services to all children. To this end, LEAs need to receive more accurate
and timely information about a child's special education needs and parental in-
volvement from child protection workers. If state law requires that a parent's
427
educational rights be independently adjudged, as in California, this should
happen at the initial jurisdictional hearing of a child protection case, and the
child protection agency should be required to either request the appointment of
an educational surrogate or work directly with the parent to advocate for the
child's education. The standard for courts to limit the educational rights of a
parent must be fairly low and frequently monitored to ensure the enforcement
of the rights of all children and parents, including functional parents, under
IDEA.
Additionally, whenever possible LEAs should appoint surrogate parents
who know the child and are already participating in his or her care.428 Chil-
dren and youth who have multiple placements or are in group homes should
have consistent adults in their lives, such as a non-caregiving relative or a
CASA, appointed as a surrogate parent. One very significant positive change in
the final regulations accompanying the amended IDEA was the facilitation of
foster parents acting as parents for children in special education.429 The regu-
lations do not recognize foster parents as "acting in the place of a parent," in
which case parent status automatically attaches. 430 Instead, foster parents must
meet certain criteria to act as the child's parent for IDEA purposes including
that: (1) they are not prohibited from doing so by state law; (2) the natural par-
ents' educational rights have been terminated under state law; (3) the foster
parent has "an on-going, long-term parental relationship with the child;" (4)
the foster parent is willing to make the required educational decisions; and (5)
the foster parent has no conflict of interest with the child.431 This case-by-case
analysis applies only to foster parents and not to relative caregivers (who in
some ways have less legal rights to the child) or guardians.432 Prior to this
regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(b), 433 long-term foster parents were occasion-
427 CAL. Gov. CODE § 7579.5(a) (West 1995).
428. A state statute or judicial standard may also incorporate other factors into the appointment of
an educational surrogate such as "cultural sensitivity." See CAL. Gov. CODE § 7579.5(e) (West 1995).
But the functional parenting role should be the overriding consideration in order to best meet the needs
of the child.
429. 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(b).
430. Id. § 300.20(a).
431. Id. § 300.20(b).
432. Id. § 300.20(a)(3).
433. See discussion of this new regulation, supra note 192.
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ally granted legal educational "parent" status for children in their care,434 de-
spite a limitation on state employees serving as educational advocates (dis-
cussed further below). 435 At that time, they also had to satisfy a case-by-case
analysis, proving, as under the current regulation, that they had no conflicts of
interest with the child, and also meeting additional requirements such as dem-
onstrating that not too much of their income was derived from foster parent-
ing.436 Although the new regulation is a positive step, advocacy is needed to
ensure that it is implemented, and the case-by-case analysis and state policies
limiting foster parents who can serve as educational parents continue to deny
many children in out-of-home care effective advocates.
Some states have adopted an alternative process that may provide more
flexibility, but also does not go far enough to adequately meet the educational
needs of children in out-of-home care. California, for instance, only allows pa-
rental status to be conferred upon caretakers when they have "legal custody"
over a child.4 37 This does not include foster parents since the state has legal
custody over children in the child welfare system rather than the individual
foster parent. However, instead of positing advocacy rights in persons "acting
as a parent" as laid out in IDEA, California relies on the "surrogate parent" po-
438
sition. Surrogate parents have all of the educational rights of actual parents.
Although not required to recognize foster parents as "parents" educationally,
439
California law does give foster parents preference in the selection of an educa-
tional surrogate parent,440 and many California school districts routinely ap-
434. See, e.g., Criswell v. Tennessee Dep't of Educ., 558 EHLR 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding
permanent foster parents to be parents under IDEA and thus having authority to represent child in edu-
cational matters rather than a needlessly appointed surrogate parent); In re Reynolds, 211 EHLR 470
(1986 OSEP) (discussing the adoption of plan in Tennessee that would make all foster parents parenting
for over six months "permanent" for educational parent purposes); see also Letter to Thompson, 23
IDELR 890 (OSEP 1995) (stating that there is not an absolute ban on foster parents serving as surrogate
educational parents, rather determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis).
435. Many people have pointed out that this distinction doesn't make that much sense since foster
parents are in a sense state employees since they are paid by the state, and thus would seem to be dis-
qualified under the ban on "employees involved in the care or education of children" rule outlined infra
Part lI.B. However, foster parents are distinguished since the money they receive for caring for a child
is a "reimbursement" and they are not treated as public employees. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at
141, n.18.
436. The analysis took place under the former 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514, 300.515 (1998). Letter to
Thompson, 23 IDELR 890; see also Letter to Hargan, 16 EHLR 738 (OSEP 1990) (stating that the term
"parent," as defined in federal regulations, may include foster parent or other "person acting as a par-
ent"); In re Duncan, 211 EHLR 400 (OSEP 1986) (allowing school district to refuse to recognize a
foster parent as educational surrogate if he or she doesn't meet the requirements of the old 34 C.F.R. §
300.514).
437. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56028 (West Supp. 2000).
438. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5 (West 1995).
439. Letter to Baker, 20 IDELR 1169 (OSEP 1993) (stating that federal law does not require states
to recognize a foster parent as a parent for educational purposes, but that such a recognition would be
appropriate in certain circumstances if permitted under state law).
440. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579.5(c) (West 1995) (also giving preference to a child's relatives and
court appointed special advocate).
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point foster parents and adult caretakers as surrogate parents.
Children and youth who have multiple placements or are in group homes
should have other consistent adults in their lives appointed as a surrogate par-
ent such as a non-caregiving relative or a CASA. LEAs and child protection
agencies both have a responsibility to ascertain if a child needs a surrogate par-
ent and, if so, to take steps so one can be appointed. LEAs also have a respon-
sibility to properly inform all persons acting as parents or surrogate parents of
their rights and responsibilities under IDEA. Finally, they must ensure that
teachers and school administrators include these functional parents in the IEP
process and enable them to effectively advocate for their exceptional children.
In sum, IDEA should go even further than the new regulation discussed
above and include foster parents as persons "acting in the place of a parent,"
thus allowing foster parents, like relative caregivers, to automatically serve as
parents under IDEA.44 1 This acknowledgment that many children remain in
foster care for long periods of time and become very attached to their foster
families even if they are never adopted or otherwise accorded rights to this re-
lationship is essential to a full incorporation of children in out-of-home care
into the special education system.
2. Child Protection Agencies Should Consider A Child's Educational
Needs in Selecting and Supporting Foster Families
Many important criteria inform the selection of a foster family for a place-
ment by child protection agencies, including location, availability, and place-
ment of siblings. The shortage of foster parents442 means that a great deal of
the decision comes down to availability, especially in the case of emergency
placements. Maintaining stability in school placement is often low priority,
despite being required as a factor for consideration under both federal and state
law,443 and foster parents must be selected according to their ability to meet
this need. 4  Many exceptional children qualify for specialized foster care, and
should be placed with families better prepared to meet their needs.
State child protection agencies should explicitly consider a child's special
educational needs in choosing a placement, consistent with federal law.
445
Although a child's safety, stability, and ties to siblings are extremely
important, her educational needs are integrally tied to such stability and must
be considered as well. Most importantly, child protection agencies must
inform foster families of their responsibilities with regard to a child's education
441. 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(a).
442. A CHALLENGE TO THE NATION, supra note 16, at 24 (estimating that in 1993 the child pro-
tection system was losing about 30,000 good foster homes yearly).
443. Cohen, June 5, supra note 8, at 17; see also California Department of Social Services Manual
of Policies and Procedures § 31-420.15 [hereinafter Cal. DSS Manual].
444. See, e.g., Cal. DSS Manual § 31420.17.
445. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1)(c) (West Supp. 2000) requires that each foster child's case plan include
his or her health or education records "to the extent possible."
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families of their responsibilities with regard to a child's education and apprise
them of the child's individual needs, as well as train them to advocate effec-
tively to this end. Thus, social workers should ensure that they pass on the
medical and educational information about children switching placements
446
and let foster parents know of their initial and ongoing role in the child's
schooling. Agencies as a whole must train foster families as parental advocates
for exceptional children and in turn advocate on their behalf with schools and
LEAs.
3. Schools Must Make All Families Partners in Their Children's
Education
Finally, regardless of a child's family structure or who her educational sur-
rogate parent is, it has been clearly demonstrated that schools can best educate
children when they include a child's family as much as possible in the proc-
ess.447 This is especially so as schools face greater challenges in terms of the
diverse and urgent needs of students while their resources are being cut.
448
Schools must reach out to families, especially those disadvantaged by poverty,
language, race, and other stigmatized categories, because they have tradition-
ally been excluded by the bureaucracy and professional "insider" norms of
schools.
Intersectional children, to an even greater extent than other students, have
needs that are both educational and social, and thus families and teachers need
to cooperate and address these needs together. 449 Unless these children receive
some sense of continuity from the adult role-models at home and those at
school, they will have difficulty bridging these two worlds.45° This continuity
is essential for children to have the most stable and productive learning experi-
ence, and enjoy healthy peer and teacher relationships. Moreover, if schools
reach out to all parents, then those whose children are in special education will
not be as singled Out in a stigmatizing fashion.45' Family involvement requires
that teachers acknowledge parent outreach as an important part of their job, and
446. One idea to this end is the medical and educational passport system for children in out-of-
home care being implemented by several states, and discussed further infra Part III.C. 1.
447. See generally A NEW GENERATION OF EVIDENCE: THE FAMILY IS CRITICAL TO STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT (Anne T. Henderson & Nancy Berla eds., 1997) [hereinafter NEW GENERATION OF
EVIDENCE].
448. See generally URGENT MESSAGE: FAMILIES CRUCIAL TO SCHOOL REFORM (Anne C. Lewis
& Anne T. Henderson eds., 1997) [hereinafter URGENT MESSAGE).
449. Parental involvement in schools to meet the social and academic needs of students is a key
principle of the renowned Comer School Development Program. Id. at 45.
450. Introduction, in NEW GENERATION OF EVIDENCE, supra note 447, at 11 (citing the work of
James Comer).
451. Minow, Bilingual & Special Education, supra note 104, at 206-25 (discussing Joel Handler's
study of a special education program in Madison, Wisconsin that made special education part of a con-
tinuum of all educational services and included all parents first as school district members).
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that they are trained to do so. This rarely happens and is a major barrier to
family-school partnerships.45 2 Adult caretakers need to be regularly informed
about the performance and behavior of their children in order to best collabo-
rate with teachers toward solutions. For instance, teachers can send home
weekly notebooks recording children's progress and make a special effort to
contact less involved guardians to invite them to school-wide fairs and other
events.
A key step to better incorporating children in out-of-home care into schools
is expanding the definition of 'parent.' For children in out-of-home care, a
simple yet insensitive assignment such as asking students to draw their family
tree "beginning with the parents" can be traumatic. 453 Further, teachers can
best understand children's experiences and meet their needs by finding out who
actually cares for a child and what adults are significant in his or her life, in-
cluding older siblings and other relatives, foster parents, and social workers.454
This is particularly important for exceptional children who otherwise risk go-
ing unidentified or, alternatively, risk being placed in inappropriate or overly
restrictive settings. Teachers can enormously increase the opportunity for chil-
dren without consistent caretakers to be in an appropriate and inclusive educa-
tional placement if they remain aware of their needs and strengths and take re-
sponsibility for referring them for special education assessments and
monitoring the effectiveness of their IEPs.
After identifying each child's family, schools should include them in
school programs and in planning the child's education. Schools around the
country have found diverse ways to incorporate families, ranging from family
centers offering social and educational services for children and adults455 to
involving "parents" of all kinds directly in the decision-making of the school.
Other schools involve families in their curricula, both substantively by dis-
cussing diverse experiences, and by inviting them in as volunteers of all kinds.
For instance the inclusionary kindergarten class at the New Haggerty School in
Watertown, Massachusetts organizes a "special day" for each child wherein
one unspecified adult friend or relative comes in to work with the class on an
activity, ranging from kite-building to baking to reading. Reaching out to
families for help and to celebrate and share in their children's successes gives
parents of all kinds, including foster parents, a stake in the outcome, and added
incentives to assist the child's progress, for instance in helping with homework.
452. URGENT MESSAGE, supra note 448, at 16.
453. Telephone Interview with Jim Mahsuz, Director of the Family Center in Somerville, Massa-
chusetts (Apr., 1997).
454. This strategy is important for reaching out to other communities often excluded from schools,
including African-American families. See JOCELYN A. GARLINGTON, HELPING DREAMS SURVIVE: THE
STORY OF A PROJECT INVOLVING AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE EDUCATION OF THEIR
CHILDREN 67-68 (1991).
455. This entails sensitivity to the privacy concerns of families. Id. at 58-63.
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By starting with an assessment of every family's strengths, rather than with a
measurement of deviation from a standard "norm," teachers and administrators
can work with children's guardians and caregivers for a more cohesive and ef-
ficient long-term educational plan for each child.
C. Take Steps To Identify Children in Out-of-Home Care and Stabilize Their
Educational Placements
Children in out-of-home care may be under-identified for special education
due in part to their extreme mobility.456 Transition from one residential situa-
tion to the next frequently means that children in out-of-home care do not re-
main in the same educational placement due to lost records, disputes between
school districts over costs, et cetera. To address some of these needs, excep-
tional children in foster care must be accorded additional identification and
placement security measures. Simultaneously, however, there must be a rec-
ognition that referrals to special education must continue to be based on indi-
vidualized determinations and that these individual determinations must be
conducted carefully in order to avoid the equally pernicious problem of over
identification of children based upon their situation or bias related to that
situation.
1. State and Local Educational Agencies Have a Heightened
Responsibility To Fulfill the IDEA Child Find Mandate with
Regard to Children in Out-of-Home-Care
The lack of consistent care and advocacy for children in foster care means
that states and LEAs should take additional steps to identify exceptional chil-
dren among this group and to ensure that they are receiving the special educa-
tion and related services that they are entitled to under IDEA.457 A "child find"
mechanism should be articulated that is specifically geared toward identifica-
tion of children in out-of-home care and this mechanism should be designed to
specifically account for the lack of strong parental advocacy and prevalence of
unique educational risks that often characterize intersectional children. Such a
mechanism could be justified as a necessary procedural protection for children
who are dependents of the state under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2).
In addition to the more usual methods of identifying children, which in-
clude community education, census taking,458 and medical and teacher refer-
456. Children in out-of-home care are also likely to be over-identified due to their repeated in-
volvement with service providers and bias against them on the part of some educators, as discussed su-
pra Part I.C. This problem requires consistent parental advocacy to ensure that a child is in the LRE
possible and can transition out of special education if ready. Reforms toward increasing the quantity
and quality of educational advocates for children in out-of-home care are discussed supra at Part III.A..
457. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (West 2000).
458. THOMAS & RUSSO, supra note 91, at 40.
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rals, educational agencies should initiate systematic referral methods among
child protection workers, foster families, group homes, CASAs, and other
adults working with children in out-of-home care. All referrals should then be
noted in a child's educational and medical passport and the educational agency
governing the first referral would be responsible for periodically checking to
ensure the child is continuing to receive services, or, alternatively, that the
child has not been inappropriately placed in a restrictive environment, de-
pending on if he or she was found to have special education needs. Because
children in out-of-home care are subject to many environmental and situational
stresses which could lead to a need for special education at one point and not at
another, educators and social workers must be sure to allow children and youth
mobility out of special education when appropriate, again without waiting for
parental advocacy. This may require periodic academic assessments for chil-
dren in out-of-home care so that no one test is responsible for labeling stu-
dents.459 More than one assessment method should be used and assessments
should be conducted so as not to incorporate bias against children in out-of-
home care. Such an assessment structure could easily be modeled on the re-
cent inclusion of such requirements in IDEA with regard to children of color
and children whose first language is not English.46°
Preventive screening, tutoring, or counseling of all children in out-of-home
461care could also be justified under IDEA, and the benefits of tracking and
monitoring under a program "designed to serve the unique educational needs of
children in foster care,' ' 462 including general education, special education and
independent living skills development outweigh the detriments of stigma.463
School personnel should already know which children are state dependents, for
residency and emergency notification purposes, and thus can use this knowl-
edge for positive preemptive screening and support. However, it must be em-
phasized that school personnel would violate the IDEA requirement for an in-
dividualized determination of eligibility if they referred children for special
459. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at i0 (citing recommendation of Professor Trudy Festinger,
author of NO ONE EVER ASKED Us: A POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE).
460. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1414(b)(2)-(3) (West 2000).
461. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(2) (West 2000). In a related argument, Kevin Ryan outlines justifica-
tion for runaway prevention screening and counseling of foster youth based on a constitutional substan-
tive due process right to adequate care in state custody. See generally Ryan, supra note 64. Such an
argument might be applicable in the special education context as well, but as IDEA already provides
clear statutory rights to procedural and other protections, it is unnecessary to take on the difficulties of a
potentially unrecognized substantive due process claim.
462. Brochure, Foster Youth Services (on file with author). Such a program exists in several
counties in California, called Foster Youth Services (F.Y.S.).
463. The alternative transitional school created and monitored under the Katie I. Consent Decree
contains just such a provision to "orient" all foster care children in shelter care attending the school
whether they are eligible for special education or not to "[identify] and [assess] each child's educational
needs," "[make] placements consistent with [these] needs, and "[implement] an educational program for
each child." Katie I. Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 19.
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education solely for being a dependent of the state.464
2. Exceptional Children in Out-of-Home Care Could Be Guaranteed
Educational Placement Stability Via a Stay-Put Provision
Children in out-of-home care receiving special education services require
some guarantee of educational continuity despite their vulnerability to home
placement, and subsequent educational placement, change.465 To this end,
IDEA and state laws should incorporate a "stay-put" provision for children in
out-of-home care. The existing stay-put provision in disciplinary matters can
provide guidance to this end, as can the residency rules for homeless children
outlined in the federal Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (herein-
466
after the McKinney Act). IDEA currently prohibits schools from changing a
child's placement for more than a very limited time during disciplinary or IEP
appeal procedures because this would constitute a change in placement without
a full IEP and all of the procedural protections guaranteed therein.467 The
McKinney Act requires LEAs to either allow homeless children to continue
their education in their original school district for the remainder of the school
year or enroll them in the school district where they actually live, depending
upon the child or youth's best interests.
468
A stay-put provision designed for exceptional children in out-of-home care
should allow them to remain in their original educational placement pending a
new IEP and due process, like the current IDEA disciplinary stay-put measure,
unless the child herself wishes to change placement. The statute should specify
that the original school district would be responsible for costs until the child is
moved, including related services such as transportation. There could be an
exception for unfeasibility, such as the placement of the child very far away
geographically. 469 Even in an exceptional case, however, the original school
would still be required to expedite records transfers and cover the IEP cost at
the new placement.
464. See the allegation to this regard in the Katie L Consent Decree, id. at 7.
465. The unique vulnerability of children in out-of-home care to sudden and repeated home
placement change, coupled with their low levels of parental advocacy and high levels of educational
risk, are strong arguments for creating a special provision focused toward their stability alone. Although
exceptional children may move with their parents or among relatives, the situation is not as common nor
as systemic and thus can be adequately handled under the current IDEA.
466. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11432 (West 1995).
467. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1415(j)-(k) (West 2000). The most recent amendments allow schools to
move exceptional children to an "appropriate interim placement" if they are disciplined for weapons and
drugs offenses, but this exception is not really applicable to the situation of children in out-of-home
care. Id. § (k)(l)(A)(ii).
468. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11432(g)(3)(A) (West 1995).
469. The Katie I. Consent Decree contains a stay-put provision for children in shelter foster care
with multiple exceptions including transportation time between residential placement and school ex-
ceeding an hour each way and best service of the child's educational needs. Katie . Consent Decree,
supra note 141, at 9.
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3. Educators and Child Protection Workers Must Facilitate
Transitions for Exceptional Children in Out-of-Home Care
A stay-put provision such as that outlined above could greatly reduce the
detrimental effects of mobility on exceptional children in foster care. Addi-
tionally, or in the absence of such a measure, child protection workers, teach-
ers, and school administrators can greatly reduce the gaps in service provision
and emotional trauma that often accompany these children's frequent moves.
Facilitating record transfers is pivotal to avoid the loss of vital educational in-
470formation. Both child protection workers and educators play a key role in
ensuring that this happens efficiently. Child protection workers are responsible
for providing detailed medical and education records to foster families and
group home counselors.47' The child protection workers must also inform
schools as to a child's surrogate parent or lack thereof, and work with the LEA
toward obtaining a surrogate appointment if the child needs it. They should
then work with a child's care provider or surrogate parent to ensure that they
know how to and actually do access the educational records from the last
school placement. The foster family and social worker must insist upon the
local school's acceptance of the child regardless of space availability, place-
ment in a special education setting most similar to the last one, an IEP within
30 days, and the provision of a related service such as transportation should
472this be necessary.
LEAs and schools are responsible for honoring residency rules in allowing
all children to enroll.473 They also must request records quickly for new stu-
dents, and in turn expedite record transfers themselves. In this regard, we can
again be informed by the McKinney Act, which mandates that schools main-
tain the records of homeless children "so that the records are available, in a
timely manner, when a child or youth enters a new school district.' '47 4 An LEA
has also expedited educational record transfers for children in out-of-home care
as part of a consent decree, and reviewed their procedures for record transfers
up to monthly to ensure that they were not delaying children's appropriate
placement in school.475 Such a requirement should be read into IDEA as an
essential part of the ongoing provision of services and system of procedural
safeguards underlying both the act in general as well as more specific provi-
470. For exceptional children, these include IEPs, transcripts, previous referrals for a special edu-
cation evaluation, and immunization records.
471. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTIT. CODE § 16010.
472. Foster Youth Services, School Placement of Foster Children: Process and Procedures (Apr.
21, 1998) (on file with author).
473. See the more detailed discussion of these requirements supra Part lI.C.
474. 42 U.S.C.A. § l1432(g)(5)(A) (West 1995).
475. Katie L Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 5-6.
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sions, such as the "child find" and "stay put" requirements.
Above the bare minimum of ensuring that records are timely transferred,
school personnel can further ease the emotional disruption of moves by creat-
ing an atmosphere that welcomes children, for instance by pairing new children
with peers, helping them enroll in lunchtime and after school activities, and
developing "rituals" for teachers and administrators to utilize to ease the tran-
sition for students and their parents. 477 Simple steps by individual educators
can go a very long way-staff at two schools in Massachusetts personally
drove foster children who had moved to and from school for months to enable
the children to stay in the same school with their siblings.478
D. Children in Out-of-Home Care Have a Right to Interagency Coordination,
Appropriate Placements, and Related Services Under IDEA
In addition to guaranteeing every exceptional child an appropriate place-
ment in the least restrictive environment, IDEA requires states and LEAs to
take other steps to best educate all exceptional children. The provisions man-
dating interagency coordination and the provision of related services are par-
ticularly relevant to the equal provision of special education to children in out-
of-home care.
1. Children in Out-of-Home Care Are Entitled to Interagency
Coordination
IDEA mandates interagency coordination in the provision of special edu-
cation and related services 479 and further recognizes the importance of inter-
agency coordination by allowing states to use excess funds to establish and ex-
pand interagency services. 480 Both educators and child protection workers
stress the need for greater interagency cooperation in the case of children at the
intersection of the special education and child welfare systems. A holistic ap-
proach to each child could result in the identification of all of his or her needs,
thereby preventing children from falling through the cracks and streamlining
services. Coordination allows professionals from different spheres to best ac-
cess funding for a child's needs while at least attempting to minimize the re-
strictiveness of educational and residential placements. It further enables all
adults involved in the long term care of a child to coordinate a long term plan
476. Proper upkeep of a child's records is also essential to fulfilling the IDEA requirement that
parents or educational surrogate have a right to inspect a child's records. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1)
(West 2000).
477. WEISSBOURD, supra note 205, at 110.
478. The Mary Lyons School in Brighton, MA and the Tobin School in Roxbury, MA, both visited
by the author in March 1997.
479. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(12) (West 2000).
480. 20 U.S.C.A. § 141 1(f)(4)(A)(iv) (West 2000).
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for her, rather than responding to crises in one sphere without considering the
impact on another.481 Interagency cooperation, particularly in terms of fund-
ing, can be a complex undertaking requiring considerable efforts on the part of
school and child protection administrators. Collaboration must take place at all
levels - from individual teacher or principal and social worker to county-wide.
However, there are a number of programs that provide a model for interagency
cooperation. One inclusion pilot school in Massachusetts, for instance, focuses
on structuring innovative arrangements that are cost-effective for both the child
welfare and education departments, such as placing children in private residen.-
482tial care in a mainstream classroom with added supports. The school staff
see themselves as advocates for children in foster care with both the child pro-
tection and educational agencies. By "lobbying" for these children, educators
can avoid special education referrals that are really designed to obtain needed
services outside of education-an unfortunately all-too-common situation.483
Coordination between child protection and educational agencies on a larger
scale also demonstrates the potential for interagency cooperation and reform.
A Massachusetts project paired ten elementary schools with ten child protec-
tion offices to consult about at-risk children. The category of at-risk children is
defined as any child with EBD and particularly focuses on foster children.
484
Social workers train teachers and vice versa. The two groups coordinate chil-
dren's protection and educational plans, and develop programs to better inte-
grate foster parents into the school system. An initial assessment of the pro-
gram by the child protection administrator responsible for its coordination
revealed that it had resulted in greatly improved communication between agen-
cies and a related enhancement of service provision to children.48 5
A collaboration between child protection, educational, and other agencies
481. Such a plan ideally involves other actors besides educators and child protection workers, such
as police officers and health-care providers, in order to better prevent child abuse and neglect and the
concomitant removal to foster care, and to help children recover from its effects. A creative program
linking the child protection agency and schools via computer was recently developed in New York City.
It is hoped that giving the agency access to school absence and other records will increase the reporting
and intervention of child abuse. See Dale Russakoff, The Protector, THE NEW YORKER, April 21, 1997,
at 69.
482. Interview with Dr. Mary Nash, Principal, Mary Lyon School in Brighton, MA (Mar., 1997).
Dr. Nash calls the effective coordination of services to children "a fiscal game." Such arrangements can
be abused to shift funding from one agency to another, as some critics accused the Massachusetts De-
partment of Social Services of doing when it launched a Commonworks program which would shift half
of its residential school population into public schools, allegedly to get special education funding for
these children. See Kate Zernike, Bad Behavior, Special Treatment: Special Ed, A System Disabled,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1997, at AI & A8.
483. Interview with Dr. Mary Nash, supra note 482.
484. Telephone interview with Susan Stalk, Administrator, Massachusetts Department of Social
Services (Apr. 1997). Ms. Stalk is the administrator responsible for coordination with Boston Public
Schools. The Massachusetts D.S.S. and Boston Public Schools are fund-sharing through an interagency
service agreement, and this pilot project received additional funds from the Kellogg Foundations' Mas-
sachusetts Families for Kids.
485. Id.
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in California is specifically addressing the lack of special education referral
and service provision for children in out-of-home care.486 The cooperative
project was initiated by Foster Youth Services (F.Y.S.), an agency in several
California school districts which was "designed to serve the unique educational
needs of children in foster care, ' ,487 including general education, special educa-
tion and independent living skills development. Recently vetoed state legisla-
tion would have increased Foster Youth Services funding, allowing it to ex-
pand potentially to all California counties.488 F.Y.S. is currently jointly funded
by school districts and by county child protection agencies. A diverse range of
service providers and advocates, including child protection workers, a proba-
tion officer, special education administrators, and children's legal advocates,
are meeting in part to identify protocols for the identification and placement of
exceptional foster children. By opening lines of communication among vari-
ous service providers, as well as clearly outlining each party's responsibilities
toward a particular child, the F.Y.S. project has already taken important steps
toward better serving the needs of these intersectional children, and can serve
as a model for other interagency efforts.
2. Children in Out-of-Home Care Merit Appropriate Placements and
Adequate Related Services to Special Education Under IDEA
All exceptional children have a right to an appropriate placement under
IDEA, including related services. 489 This may include learning social and ba-
sic life skills, or being provided with non-academic services such as social
work case management and psychological counseling or transportation. These
entitlements under IDEA are particularly vital for children in out-of-home care
who often have many non-academic barriers to successful achievement in
school. Children's advocates can use the IDEA mandate not only to fulfill a
child's educational needs, but also to access services to assist in the child's
health and well-being at home-which are connected to his or her school per-
formance.490 In this fashion, special education can be seen as a system which
considers the holistic care and well-being of children.
An appropriate placement and related services for children in out-of-home
care may arguably encompass a wide range of services including a curriculum
incorporating the unique needs of children who have been abused or neglected
and in multiple placements, staff development regarding the needs and situa-
486. I participated in some of the meetings of the Contra Costa County Foster Youth Services to
identify the problems and work out some of the protocols.
487. Brochure, Foster Youth Services brochure (on file with author).
488. California AB 2012 (2000).
489. See discussion of the FAPE and related services requirements supra Part 1.B.
490. Similarly, children's advocates have used IDEA to access better services for children in de-
linquency institutions. See Glennon & Schwartz, supra note 264, at 1565 n.57 (discussing Nick 0. v.
Terhune, No. 89-0755 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (stipulation and order filed)).
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tions of foster children, counseling and transportation for all children in out-of-
home care, procedures to stabilize children's educational placements such as
those outlined above, and special advocacy agencies such as Foster Youth
Services to liase between the child protection and special education systems.
491
A cohesive approach to meeting all of a child's needs through an FAPE and
related services could take the form of school-based wraparound services, a
mode of service delivery discussed at greater length below.
E. Provide Special Education and Related Services Preventively and Widely
Through Grassroots Involvement
Even more than other children who are eligible for special education, chil-
dren in out-of-home care need to be provided with a full range of preventive
services in a comprehensive fashion. To this end, the preschool- and school-
aged special education programs can be greatly informed by the IDEA program
for infants and toddlers, Early Intervention, which is preventive and geared to-
ward the needs and strengths of the whole family, rather than looking at a child
in isolation from her caretakers and community. Other steps toward better
serving exceptional children in out-of-home care include the implementation of
preventive and "whole-school" approaches in order to prevent the need for
children to be labeled before they can receive services, and further collabora-
tion between child welfare, educational and other social service agencies, and
workers at a grassroots level.
1. Early Intervention Can Serve as a Model Program Addressing
Children's Special Home and School Needs
The Early Intervention (E.I.) program, contained in Part C of the 1997
Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, is designed to
support infants and toddlers who are developmentally delayed 492 or are at risk
of becoming so.4 9 3 Part C thus differs significantly in both its mission and its
structure from the rest of IDEA and from child protective legislation. The
Early Intervention program is explicitly preventive-funding services not only
to children with developmental delays, but also to children at risk of becoming
developmentally delayed.494 To this end, it has both a more flexible definition
of eligibility and a wider application than the other legislative schemes outlined
earlier in which a child is only eligible if he or she is already disabled, or has
been abused, neglected or abandoned.
491. All of these services are present in some form in the Katie I. Consent Decree.
492. As defined by the state per 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1432(3), 1435(a)(1) (West 2000).
493. The E.I. entitlement interacts with other federal programs providing services for at-risk or
disabled pre-schoolers such as Head Start. See WARBOYs ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
494. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1431(b)(4) (West 2000).
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The E.I. system lies at the juncture of special education and child welfare in
that it addresses delays or risks in infants and toddlers that affect their home
life, and may result from their home life, but that will also affect future educa-
tional success and inclusion. Part C explicitly takes as one of its purposes the
prevention of a need for future special education services, and implicitly aims
to prevent out-of-home placement of children by better supporting their fami-
lies before any abuse or neglect occurs, particularly where families are already
stressed by poverty, isolation, or racism.495 Many children need early inter-
vention services for developmental delays resulting from abuse and neglect.496
Thus, the E.I. program does not narrowly focus only on a child's family or
school situation-as do special education and child welfare legislation-but
rather takes a holistic approach to a child's development within his or her fam-
ily. Such services can greatly improve a child's chances of securing a safe and
nurturing home placement, either with his parents or out of the home.
Infants and toddlers may qualify for E.I. if they are aged from birth through
age two and fall into one of the following three broad categories: (1) currently
experiences a developmental delay in cognitive, physical, communication, so-
cial or emotional, or adaptive development; (2) has a physical or mental condi-
tion with a high probability of resulting in developmental delay; or, at a state's
discretion, (3) is at-risk of having substantial developmental delay if not pro-
vided with E.I. services. 49 7 States have the option whether to provide services
to the latter category of at-risk infants and toddlers, whereas they must provide
services to the first two categories of children if they accept funding under Part
C.4 1' As of 1996, all fifty states had chosen to receive federal support for
Early Intervention, and up to forty-one were in full compliance with then-Part
H.
4 99
The preventive purposes underlying E.I., and its widespread mandate, re-
sult in more flexible and less stigmatizing definitions than those that govern the
larger special education system. The rationale underlying the use of the term
developmentally delayed makes very clear Congress' desire to avoid labeling
in the E.I. context as much as possible: the term was chosen "in order to pre-
vent locking the child into an eligibility category that may be inappropriate or
495. The findings underlying Part C illustrate this dual purpose: "The Congress finds that there is
an urgent and substantial need ... (2) to reduce the educational costs to our society, including our na-
tion's schools, by minimizing the need for special education and related services after infants and tod-
dlers with disabilities reach school age; (3) to minimize the likelihood of institutionalization of indi-
viduals with disabilities and maximize the potential for their independent living in society; (4) to
enhance the capacity of families to meet the special needs of their infants and toddlers with disabilities.
. (5) to enhance the capacity of state and local agencies and service providers to identify, evaluate, and
meet the needs of historically underrepresented populations, particularly minority, low-income, inner-
city and rural populations." 20 U.S.C.A. § 143 1(a) (West 2000).
496. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 82.
497. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1432(5), 1435 (West 2000).
498. Id. §§ 1432(5)(B), 1435.
499. THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 37.
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incorrect." 500 Inclusion is a very important part of E.I., as with special educa-
tion and child welfare, 50 1 and states are mandated to provide services "to the
maximum extent appropriate ... in natural environments, including the home,
and community settings in which children without disabilities participate."
502
The holistic approach of E.I. is reflected in the "comprehensive, coordi-
nated, multidisciplinary, interagency" 50 3 network of services it provides for
infants and toddlers. Services revolve around the family rather than the indi-
vidual child, and parental rights are emphasized as under Part B of IDEA.
504
Thus, the "individualized family service plan" forms the core of E.I., and fo-
cuses on the strengths and needs of both the infant or toddler and his or her
family.50 5 Services are not divided into educational or "related" home-based
services, but rather encompass a wide variety of needs in both realms, such as
family training, counseling and home visits, speech therapy, transportation, oc-
cupational therapy, and social work services. 50 6 E.I. services have been proven
to be very effective at facilitating the development of children with certain dis-
abilities and, thereby, reducing the need for later restrictive special education
placements.50 7
Although E.I. has different capacities and limitations because it is designed
for very young children, the special education and foster care systems can be
informed by some of its principles. First, the preventive approach of E.I. could
be adapted to the special education and child welfare systems and used to pre-
vent restrictive special education and out-of-home care placements before they
become necessary. The education system could provide extra services to chil-
dren at-risk of a more restrictive referral, or to all children, ideas that find some
support in IDEA and are outlined further below in Part III.E. The child welfare
system could, and is beginning to, assist families and children before abuse and
neglect mandate removal through home visiting and other preventive pro-
grams.5
08
Additionally, the systems serving children in home and at school can be in-
formed by the holistic approach of E.I.. The home and school situations of
children and youth are inextricably intertwined, requiring solutions that take
500. 62 Fed. Reg. 55026-01 at 55031.
501. See Part 11 infra.
502. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1432(4)(G) (West 2000).
503. 20 U.S.C.A. § 143 1(b)(1) (West 2000).
504. For instance, written parental consent is required prior to an initial evaluation and assessment
of a child and the initiation of E.I. services, although a lack of consent may sometimes be overrridden by
a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 303.404(a); 34 C.F.R. § 303.404, n.2.
505. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1436(a)(1)-(2) (West 2000).
506. Id. § 1432(4).
507. WARBOYS ET AL., supra note 4, at 80.
508. C.D.F. YEARBOOK 1997, supra note 18, at 57-59; see also Indira A. Lakshmanan, Hawaii
Abuse Prevention May Catch on in Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 1996, at 1 (discussing highly suc-
cessful home visiting program used to reduce child abuse and neglect in Hawaii).
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both into account. In beginning from a multidisciplinary, coordinated focus on
children's family and future educational development, the E.I. model demon-
strates potential common ground and practical collaborations between the child
welfare and special education systems serving older children.
2. Educators Are Empowered To Implement More Pre-Labeling and
Whole-School Approaches by the IDEA Amendments of 1997
As long as the entire burden of difference is made to reside in one child, 0 9
educators and child protection workers will continue to face the impossible
choice between the stigma that may accompany labeling and enabling a child
to access needed services as they contemplate identifying and referring chil-
dren for special education. Moreover, the due process protections laid out in
IDEA are not sufficient to achieve better substantive outcomes for all excep-
tional children.5 10 Instead, the role and structure of schools need to be ex-
panded to include the diversity of children being educated today, and the vari-
ety of academic and non-academic skills essential to future employment and
citizenship. The IDEA Amendments of 1997 propose just such a "whole-
school" approach and "pre-referral intervention to reduce the need to label
children as disabled in order to address their learning needs."511 A universal
and preventive approach to special education may be particularly beneficial to
exceptional children in out-of-home care since they are doubly stigmatized and
at-risk for more restrictive placement.
The funding provisions of the amended IDEA also empower schools and
LEAs to develop more broad-based approaches to special education. The
IDEA Amendments of 1997 substantially change the special education funding
provisions by basing them in part on the relative populations of children and
youth aged 3 through 21 living in poverty. 512 These provisions alleviate
somewhat the need to identify individual children as disabled in order to obtain
funds, thus allowing states to use some IDEA funding for general preventive
and remedial services for all children, and reducing incentives for restrictive
placements. 5 13 The funding provisions also provide more flexibility to state
and local educational agencies in formulating and shaping programs. Preven-
tive services can be more cost-effective by prohibiting the need for more ex-
509. Supra Part II.A. (discussing Martha Minow's elaboration of"the dilemma of difference").
510. Macchiarola et al., supra note 179, at 604. See also Minow, Bilingual and Special Education,
supra note 104, at 416 (stating that the "substantive dimensions [of IDEA] are overshadowed by the
rigor of its procedural protections").
511. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(F) (West 2000).
512. Id. § 1411(e)(3)(A)(i)(II)-(Ill). The full scope and impact of these changes in the IDEA
funding are beyond the scope of this Article.
513. The IDEA Amendments appear to address some of the critiques of the categorical per-child
funding structure addressed in The Packard Foundation's 1996 study of special education. See THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 12-15.
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pensive (and restrictive) services and placements in the future, a purpose ex-
plicitly recognized in the Early Intervention Part of IDEA.514 These changes
may have particular significance for children in out-of-home care who risk be-
ing referred to more restrictive school environments than they may need be-
cause special education is the easiest way to access funding during the current
drastic shortages of child protection and welfare funds.515
LEAs can look to school districts already performing preventive interven-
tions before special education referral and to the Early Intervention program as
models. San Francisco Unified School District, for instance, implements "stu-
dent study teams" to assess students who are not performing well in school and
to attempt to formulate and implement supports for students that are less re-
strictive than special education, such as tutoring or mentoring. 516 Massachu-
setts Department of Education regulations require school personnel to make
and document extensive efforts to adjust or modify a child's regular education
program before referring him or her to special education. 517 This may include
working with the school social worker, changing the child's schedule or
switching her teacher. LEAs can follow this approach in providing preventive
services to at-risk students before they are assessed as disabled, perhaps pre-
venting such a diagnosis. Like the possible inclusion of at-risk infants and
toddlers under the Early Intervention program, prevention services to students
can lower the need for referral and more expensive services later. Some stu-
dents will still require special education identification and services, but others
can be helped to succeed under IDEA and other educational funding statutes518
without bearing the burden of the unnecessary stigma and segregation that can
result from referral. Preventive educational services can also lower the need
for removal of children from the home, if abuse or neglect is related to parental
inability to cope with a child's disability.
519
Great care must be taken in identifying students as at-risk to use as objec-
tive a set of criteria as possible and avoid broad generalizations. Although chil-
514. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a)(2) (West 2000) (finding that there is a need "to reduce the educational
costs to our society, including our Nation's schools, by minimizing the need for special education and
related services after infants and toddlers with disabilities reach school age").
515. However, a move toward more census-based funding like that outlined above does create the
risk that educational agencies will identify and provide fewer special education services. See THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 77, at 14.
516. This policy in part grew out of the goal of reducing the overrepresentation of students of
color in special education. Abigail Trilling, Legal Services for Children staff attorney, training for
L.S.C. Interns (April 1998).
517. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 766, § 314.
518. For instance, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provides funding to
schools to improve the educational success of low-income students currently not achieving in school.
Title I funds may be used either for "schoolwide programs" or "targeted assistance programs" geared to
those students most in need. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6314-15 (West 2000).
519. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at 10.
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dren can easily and maybe sometimes should be 52  categorized together by
their child protective status, "treating the categor[y] as though [it] existed and
as though [it] defined a person's identity and worth is another matter." 521 Not
all children in out-of-home care, for instance are educationally at-risk, but
many will be because of excessive mobility, lack of advocates and the other
factors outlined above in Part I.C. Only when these factors appear, and a child
demonstrates behavioral522 or academic needs do the benefits of individual in-
tervention outweigh its potential stigma. Otherwise, educators and child pro-
tection workers can and arguably should monitor students in high-risk catego-
ries without singling them out for special treatment.
Pre-referral interventions and the provision of preventive support services
are closely related to inclusion. In practice, preventive interventions have two
major components: classroom interventions by teachers and related service
provision by schools and other agencies. For instance, certain modified in-
structional methods can be used very successfully to include some children
with emotional and behavioral disorders in the mainstream classroom without a
special education referral, such as direct instruction or peer tutoring. 523 Stu-
dents may need to acquire social skills for inclusion, either because they have
EBD 524 or because they have never learned how to behave from adult role
models. For instance, learning to negotiate and to express feelings appropri-
ately may be particularly important for foster children who are often from
family settings wherein such conflict resolution skills were never taught or
used. This kind of learning through appropriate social interaction with peers
and teachers cannot happen as effectively if children are segregated into special
education. In one study, a group of teachers' use of interventions including
behavior modification and cooperative learning exercises before referring fos-
ter children to special education was one factor in the sixty-three to one-
hundred percent drops in referral rates.
525
3. Child Protection and Education Agencies Should Collaborate on
School-Linked Services
The complex and interconnected needs of intersectional children cannot be
adequately addressed under the existing rigid and separate service provision
systems. This is particularly true when one of the service systems, such as
520. Foster Youth Services, for instance, tracks the educational needs and performance of all chil-
dren in out-of-home care in their jurisdiction due to the high risk of restrictive placements, failure and
school drop-out among this group.
521. Minow, Bilingual and Special Education, supra note 104, at 204.
522. This should include "quiet" behavior problems, such as depression and low self-esteem, as
well as the louder and more frequently noticed ones such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
523. Manganore, supra note 168.
524. Cartledge & Johnson, supra note 171, at 52.
525. Cormier, supra note 7, at 61.
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child protection, is crisis-oriented rather than preventive and long-term. A ho-
listic approach to service provision removes some of the dilemmas of labeling
by allowing advocates to access multiple services for children at once and in
coordination rather than piece meal. Schools are a good site for the coordina-
tion of services to children and families due to their history as community in-
stitutions and their mission of universal service of all children. 526 Linking non-
academic services to schooling may also improve academic performance,
thereby demonstrating the correlation between the two.5 27 School-linked
services may be justified for children in special education under the inter-
agency coordination, related services or the pre-referral and "whole-school"
provisions 528 of IDEA. Entire schools devoted to the education and special
needs of children in out-of-home care may be created at child protection shel-
ters or other agencies, with special steps made to include children not in foster
care in some classes and on exchanges.
529
The coordination and provision of services to children within schools, even
within regular classrooms, can greatly increase the potential for inclusion of all
children, thereby minimizing the need for stigmatizing special education refer-
rals. One project which brought "wraparound services" to schools decreased
referrals by up to eighty-six percent and substantially decreased the restrictive-
ness of placements for students at-risk for more restrictive placements both out
of the regular classroom and out of the public school altogether. 530 The Tobin
School in Roxbury, Massachusetts offers an extensive Family Support Program
which coordinates community resources such as health education and family
preservation through an on-school site to maximize the inclusion of children
with different social and health needs. The Mary Lyon school in Brighton,
Massachusetts provides wraparound before and after school programs to all its
students as well as teams of educators, counselors and other professionals who
work together to develop plans for each child. Foster Youth Services in Contra
Costa County, California has offices in numerous school districts which coor-
dinate educational placements and support services such as tutoring for chil-
dren and youth in out-of-home care. They also track children who have moved
among districts, serving as a source of "institutional memory" to bridge chil-
526. CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, THE DAVID AND LUCILE PACKARD FOUND.,, 2 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: SCHOOL LINKED SERVICES 8-9 ed. (Spring 1992).
527. Id. at 8.
528. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(5)(F) (West 2000).
529. For one example, see the Alternative Transitional School created under the Katie I. Consent
Decree to meet the special needs of children in out-of-home care including emotional and physical
trauma, excessive mobility, preventive screening and services and a twelve-month school year. Katie I.
Consent Decree, supra note 141, at Appendix A.
530. The number of children in the most restrictive level five dropped from seven to one in one
year and children in regular classrooms receiving wraparound services increased from five to seventeen.
Lucille Eber et al., School-Based Applications of the Wraparound Process: Early Results on Service
Provision and Student Outcomes, 5 J. OF CHILD AND FAM. STUD. 93 (1996).
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dren's different home and school placements. School-linked or wraparound
services are particularly important for children in out-of-home care who are
under the jurisdiction of multiple agencies due to their status, and who often
require multiple services. The coordination of services at school can alleviate
their frequent instability at home and enable service providers to track and
monitor children's needs and progress.
4. Grassroots Change Is Needed from Teachers, Social Workers and
All Children 's Advocates
Educators can do a great deal to provide stability and a community at
school for children in out-of-home care. One of the greatest risk factors char-
acterizing children in this group is their frequent lack of stability in relation-
ships, particularly with adults. Teachers and school administrators can create a
stable, sometimes "surrogate family" environment for their students who are in
foster care. This might mean pairing a student with an adult for regular "spe-
cial time," facilitating sibling visitation, or lobbying to have a child stay in the
school, even though he or she has moved out of district. Success in creating a
warm and nurturing environment for children requires attention to details, such
as the creation of a "Magic Lunchbox," filled by a different teacher each day,
for a child in a psychiatric hospital who has no guardian to make him lunch,53 1
or inclusion of children in out-of-home care on field trips even if they cannot
pay the ten dollar fee.5 32 Encouraging positive peer interactions is also a very
effective means of helping to integrate different children into the school com-
munity. Peer tutoring not only helps students academically, but also allows
them to learn about and cooperate with children different from themselves.
533
Increased attention to the needs of exceptional children in out-of-home care
requires increased knowledge about the reality of their situations rather than a
reliance on stereotypes or preconceptions about either disabled or foster chil-
dren. IDEA requirements regarding personnel development, support, and
training regarding special education and inclusion may be used to require
teacher training regarding the needs of children in out-of-home care. 534 In-
creased awareness of the situations and needs of children in foster care can
dramatically improve teachers' ability to effectively include these children in
general education programs. Training teachers about foster care at one school
substantially reduced special education referrals of children in out-of-home
care. 535 The training consisted of an intensive eight month program on topics
531. This example comes from the Mary Lyons School in Brighton, MA.
532. Cohen, June 12, supra note 179, at 9.
533. Cartledge & Johnson, supra note 171, at 55.
534. 34 C.F.R. § 300.555 (1999). Educational staff training regarding the needs and foster chil-
dren was part of the Katie I. Consent Decree. Katie I. Consent Decree, supra note 141, at 11.
535. Cormier, supra note 7, at 61.
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ranging from children's psychosocial and cognitive development, to the per-
sonal stories of some foster children, to coping strategies for the classroom,
and also required teachers to use three interventions before referring children.
A program need not be so extensive to yield benefits; a one-time session can
begin the process of change by enabling teachers to better understand, and thus
better teach, foster children. Such training can take many forms, such as in-
service workshops, school visits, and regular feedback sessions with profes-
sional peers. An ideal training would allow children currently and formerly in
foster care to speak to educators, as they are the best chroniclers of their own
experiences and advocates for their own needs.536 Such training is often re-
quested by teachers themselves "to address the personal and professional atti-




The child protection and special education systems interact to deny equality
to children at their intersection. Their conflicting discourses and practices
serve to further marginalize children already doubly burdened by disability or
educational risk and placement in out-of-home care. Set in a framework of
equality that relies on stigmatizing categorization in order to qualify for serv-
ices and ignores outcome, these interacting systems require change on all lev-
els-from acts by individual teachers and social workers to stabilize children's
placements, to an expansion of the definition of family and an increase in pre-
ventive educational services. The roots for change lie within the existing
statutory and legal frameworks, but will only occur with shifts in outlook and
practice among those working and caring for children. The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act promises "full equality of opportunity" to all excep-
tional children. 538 We must expand its protections and monitor its implemen-
tation to encompass the needs and situation of children in out-of-home care to
make this promise a reality for intersectional children.
536. A program such as California Youth Connection could perform such a function.
537. Cartledge & Johnson, supra note 171, at 53-54.
538. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (West 2000).
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